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From periphery to core: Measuring 
agglomeration effects using high-speed rail 
Abstract: We analyze the economic impact of the German high-speed rail (HSR) connecting Cologne and Frankfurt, 
which provides plausibly exogenous variation in access to surrounding economic mass. We find a causal effect of 
about 8.5% on average of the HSR on the GDP of three counties with intermediate stops. We make further use of the 
variation in bilateral transport costs between all counties in our study area induced by the HSR to identify the 
strength and spatial scope of agglomeration forces. Our most careful estimate points to an elasticity of output with 
respect to market potential of 12.5%. The strength of the spillover declines by 50% every 30 minutes of travel time, 
diminishing to 1% after about 200 minutes. Our results further imply an elasticity of per-worker output with respect 
to economic density of 3.8%, although the effects seem driven by worker and firm selection. 
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JEL classification: R12, R28, R38, R48 
Version: February 2017 
Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Geography 
1 Introduction 
“A major new high-speed rail line will generate many thousands of construction jobs over several years, as well as permanent 
jobs for rail employees and increased economic activity in the destinations these trains serve.”  
 US President Barack Obama, April 16, 2009 
One of the most fundamental and uncontroversial ideas in economic geography and urban economics 
is that firms and households benefit from access to economic markets due to various forms of ag-
glomeration economies (Marshall, 1920). The mutually reinforcing effects of spatial density and 
productivity can theoretically account for the highly uneven distribution of economic activity be-
tween and within regions. The strong belief that economic agents benefit from an ease of interaction 
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has always motivated large (public) expenditures into transport infrastructures, e.g., ports, airports, 
highways or railways. A striking example of an expensive, but increasingly popular transport mode is 
high-speed rail (HSR). The costs of implementing an HSR network in Britain, which mainly consists of 
a Y-shaped connection of London to Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester of about 500km length are 
scheduled to amount to as much as £42 (about $63) billion at present (Storeygard, 2012). The US 
Department of Transportation (2009) has announced its strategic plan, which proposes the construc-
tion of completely new rail lines that will feature velocities of possibly up to 400km/h (250mph). The 
plan has already identified US$8 billion plus US$1 billion a year for five years in the federal budget 
just to jump-start a program that would only be comparable to the interstate highway program of the 
20th century. The perhaps most spectacular HSR considered to date is a 7,000km line connecting the 
Russian and Chinese capitals Moscow and Beijing, currently estimated at 1.5 trillion yuan ($242 bil-
lion) (Phillips, 2015). The willingness to commit large amounts of public money to the development 
of HSR bears witness to the confidence that HSR will deliver a substantial economic impact.  
The wider economic impacts such infrastructures deliver, however, naturally depend on the strength 
and the spatial scope of the agglomeration economies they enhance.1 Estimating such agglomeration 
effects is empirically challenging. The density of economic activity and the productivity at a given 
location are not only potentially mutually dependent, but also potentially simultaneously determined 
by location fundamentals, such as a favorable geography or good institutions. The main challenge in 
estimating the strength and the spatial scope of agglomeration effects, therefore, is to find exogenous 
variation in access to the surrounding economic mass. While transport infrastructures, such as a new 
HSR, generate such variation in access to economic mass, the allocation of transport infrastructure is 
typically non-random, thus generating additional identification problems.  
In this paper we provide causal estimates of the strength and the spatial scope of agglomeration ef-
fects using a variation of the market potential approach, which links economic outcomes at a given 
locality to economic activity at surrounding localities via a transportation network. To disentangle 
the effects of market potential from other determinants of economic outcomes our identification 
stems exclusively from changes in transport technology, which affect the effective distance between 
                                                             
1  The transport appraisal literature distinguishes between user benefits, which mainly capture the value of 
shorter travel times, and wider economic impacts, such as agglomeration benefits due to higher effective 
density, moves to more productive jobs, and output changes in imperfectly competitive markets 
(Department for Transport, 2014). 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen – From periphery to core 3 
 
all pairs of locations in a region.2 Specifically, we exploit the variation in bilateral transport costs be-
tween all counties located in the German federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and Rhine-
land-Palatinate that was induced by the Cologne-Frankfurt HSR. With this research design we are 
able to control for unobserved time-invariant variation in location fundamentals and circumvent 
some of the typical challenges in estimating the effects of spatial density on economic outcomes. Giv-
en the particular institutional setting we argue that the HSR analyzed provides variation in bilateral 
transport costs that is credibly exogenous, creating a natural experiment with identifying variation 
that is as good as random.3  
The Cologne-Frankfurt HSR was inaugurated in 2002. The line is part of the Trans-European Net-
works and facilitates train velocities of up to 300km/h. The HSR reduced travel time between both 
metropolises by more than 55% in comparison to the old rail connection and by more than 35% in 
comparison to the automobile. Along the HSR line, intermediate stops were created in the towns of 
Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg. It is noteworthy that given the small population of less than 25 
and 15 thousand inhabitants in particular the stops in Limburg and Montabaur are unusual within 
the German if not European HSR network. Following the connection to the HSR line the two towns 
are within 40 minutes of Cologne and Frankfurt, which are the centers of the two largest German 
agglomerations, but also less than 10 minutes of each other.  
The final routing of the line and the location of the intermediate stops were the result of a political 
bargaining process among the rail carrier, three federal states, and several business lobby and envi-
ronmental activist groups that lasted almost 40 years. We argue that the institutional particularities, 
which we describe in more detail in Section 2, allow us to make the helpful identifying assumptions 
that the routing and the timing of the connection of Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg and the timing 
of the connection of all other stations are exogenous to the levels and trends of economic develop-
ment.  
Based on the exogenous variation provided, we are able to identify the causal impact of HSR on local 
economic development as well as the strength and the spatial scope of agglomeration economies 
                                                             
2  Storeygard (2012) uses changes in oil prices interacted with static distance measures as a source of varia-
tion in transport cost over time. 
3  Complementary literature has modelled the mutual dependence of demand for and supply of transport in-
frastructure (Levinson, 2008; Xie & Levinson, 2010). 
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promoted by the line. In the first step, we assess the effect of the HSR on the local economies within 
the counties of the intermediate stops using program evaluation techniques. In the second step, we 
correlate the growth in effective density, which we express in market potential form (Harris, 1954), 
to the economic growth across counties within our study area. The market potential expresses effec-
tive density as the transport cost weighted sum of the GDP of all counties in the study area. The 
measure takes into account the effect of the HSR on bilateral transport costs between all counties in 
our study area. Since the HSR is used exclusively for passenger service we implicitly disentangle the 
effects of facilitated human interactions from the transport costs of tradable goods, i.e., the trade 
channel. The spillovers we capture thus include Marshallian externalities related to knowledge diffu-
sion and labor market pooling and the effects of improved access to intermediated goods and con-
sumer markets to the extent that the ease of communication reduces transaction costs, but not 
freight costs.  
Theoretically, one effect of the HSR is to upgrade the accessibility of formerly peripheral areas, which 
at least during a transition period offer the benefit of relatively low land prices, and may thus become 
attractive to firms. Indeed, our results point to a positive economic impact of HSR. On average, six 
years after the opening of the line, the GDP in the counties of the intermediate stops exceeds the 
counterfactual trend established via a group of synthetic counties by 8.5%.4 We find an elasticity of 
GDP with respect to effective density, i.e., market potential, of about 12.5% in our most conservative 
model. The elasticity of output per worker with respect to effective density is, at 10%, only marginal-
ly smaller. Because our measure of effective density is spatially smoothed the variance across coun-
ties is naturally lower than in conventional density measures. Normalized by the log ratio of the 
standard deviations of effective density over actual density our results imply an elasticity of produc-
tivity with respect to employment density of 3.8%, which is close to previous estimates derived from 
cross-sectional research designs (e.g. Ciccone & Hall, 1996).5 The effect, however, seems to be driven 
to a significant extent by selection, i.e., a compositional change in industry and worker qualification 
(Combes, Duranton, & Gobillon, 2011; Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, & Roux, 2012). We further 
estimate that the strength of economic spillovers halves every 30 minutes of travel time and is near 
to zero after about 200 minutes. The spillovers we detect are significantly less localized than in pre-
                                                             
4  We create a synthetic equivalents for each treated county following Adabie and Gardeazabal (2003). 
5  Reviewing 729 estimates across 34 studies Melo et al. (2009) find a mean elasticity of 5.8%.  
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vious studies that have identified spillover effects from within-city variation (Ahlfeldt, Redding, 
Sturm, & Wolf, 2015; Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2013; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008), but are more local-
ized than the scope of spatial interactions inferred from empirical NEG models with a stronger em-
phasis on trade costs (Hanson, 2005).6  
Our research connects to a large and growing literature on the nature of agglomeration economies 
reviewed in detail in Duranton and Puga (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004). A standard ap-
proach in this literature has been to regress economic outcome measures, such as wages, against 
some measure of agglomeration, typically employment or population density.7 A smaller literature 
has exploited presumably exogenous variation in the surrounding concentration of economic activi-
ty. Rosenthal and Strange (2008) and Combes et al. (2010) use geology to instrument for density. 
Greenstone et al. (2010) analyze the effects of the openings of large manufacturing plants on incum-
bent plants. Another related strand has analyzed the impact of natural experiments such as trade 
liberalization (Hanson, 1996, 1997), wartime bombing (Davis & Weinstein, 2002), the decrease in the 
economic relevance of portage sites (Bleakley & Lin, 2014), and the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Kline & Moretti, 2014) on the spatial distribution of economic activity.  
At the intersection of both strands, Redding and Sturm (2008) have exploited the effects of the varia-
tion in access to the surrounding economic mass created by the division and unification of Germany 
on city growth. Ahlfeldt, et al. (2015) use the within-city variation in surrounding economic mass 
induced by the division and reunification of Berlin, Germany, to identify the strength and spatial 
scope of spillovers among residents and among firms as well as the rate at which commuting proba-
bilities decline in time distance. Our main contributions to this literature are twofold. First, we esti-
mate the agglomeration effects based on the variation in surrounding economic mass created by new 
transport infrastructures, which allows for a relatively robust separation of spillover effects from 
unobserved locational fundamental effects. Second, we contribute to a relatively small literature that 
has provided estimates of the rate of spatial decay in spillovers. The relatively strong spatial decay in 
spatial spillovers substantiates the intuition that moving people is more costly than moving goods.  
                                                             
6  See Head and Mayer (2004) for a review of this literature. For an introduction into the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on agglomeration, productivity and trade, see e.g. Ottaviano (2002), Behrens et al. (2014) 
or Sato and Zenou (2015). 
7  Examples include Ciccone (2002), Ciccone and Hall (1996), Dekle & Eaton (1999), Glaeser and Mare (2001), 
Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner (1995), Moretti (2004), Rauch (1993), and Sveikauskas (1975).  
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Another growing strand in the literature to which we contribute is concerned with the economic ef-
fects of transport infrastructure. Overall, the evidence suggests that a well-developed transport in-
frastructure enhances trade (Donaldson, 2015; Duranton, Morrow, & Turner, 2013), promotes eco-
nomic growth (Banerjee, Duflo, & Qian, 2012; Duranton & Turner, 2012), and, at a more local level, 
increases property prices (Baum-Snow & Kahn, 2000; Gibbons & Machin, 2005). There is also evi-
dence of asymmetric impacts on labor markets, in particular, of a relative increase in demand for 
skilled workers in skill-abundant regions (Michaels, 2008). The evidence on the impact on the spatial 
distribution of economic activity is more mixed. Within metropolitan areas radial connections tend 
to facilitate suburbanization and, thus, benefit peripheral areas (Baum-Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow, 
Loren Brandt, Henderson, Turner, & Zhang, 2012; Kopecky & Suen, 2010).8 However, there is also 
evidence that within larger regions reductions in trade costs between regions due to better road 
networks favor core regions at the expense of peripheral regions (Faber, 2014).  
Empirically, the literature evaluating the economic effects of transport infrastructure has been con-
cerned with the non-random allocation of transport infrastructure, which is usually built to accom-
modate existing or expected demand. Instrumental variables based on historic transport networks 
(Duranton & Turner, 2012), counterfactual least-cost networks (Faber, 2014) or straight-line con-
nections among regional centers (Banerjee et al., 2012) have emerged as a standard approach to es-
tablishing a causal relationship. The alternative and potentially complementary strategy adopted 
here is the so-called inconsequential units approach (Redding & Turner, 2015). This approach rests 
on the assumption that the main purpose of a transport infrastructure is often to connect regional 
agglomerations and that the connection of localities along the way is not necessarily intended 
(Chandra & Thompson, 2000; Michaels, 2008). Our contribution to this line of research is, again, two-
fold. First, we provide evidence of the economic impacts of HSR, an increasingly important but em-
pirically understudied transport mode, exploiting a source of exogenous variation. Second, we show 
that peripheral regions can benefit from a better connectivity to core regions if the cost of human 
interaction is reduced but trade costs remain unchanged.9 This evidence complements the extant 
literature suggesting that HSR primarily benefits large cities, but not necessarily remote counties 
                                                             
8  Such a tendency of decentralization in response to reductions in transport costs is in line with standard ur-
ban models in the spirit of Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969). 
9  This finding is in line with evidence suggesting that well developed transport infrastructures are associated 
with less spatial concentration (Ramcharan, 2009) 
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(Lin, 2014; Qin, 2016; Zheng & Kahn, 2013). The evidence of positive effects emerging from Marshal-
lian externalities is also complementary to the recent evidence of negative effects on peripheral re-
gions operating through a trade channel (Faber, 2014). Our results similarly complement literature 
on suburbanization (Baum-Snow, 2007; Garcia-López, 2012; Garcia-López, Holl, & Viladecans-Marsal, 
2015) by showing that a HSR is less likely to decentralize population to suburbs than a highway. 
The next section introduces the institutional setting in more detail and discusses the data used. In 
Section 3 we conduct a program evaluation with a focus on the impact of HSR on the economies of 
the counties of the intermediate stations. In Section 4 we then exploit the full variation the HSR in-
duced in bilateral transport costs between all counties in our study area to estimate the strength and 
spatial scope of agglomeration effects. The final section concludes. 
2 Background and data 
A – The Cologne–Frankfurt HSR Line  
The HSR line from Cologne to Frankfurt/Main is part of the priority axis Paris-Brussels-Cologne-
Amsterdam-London (PBKAL), which is one of 14 projects of the Trans-European Transport Network 
(TEN-T) as endorsed by the European Commission in 1994. In comparison to the old track alongside 
the river Rhine, the new HSR connects the Rhine/Ruhr area (including Cologne) and the Rhine/Main 
area (including Frankfurt) almost directly, reducing track length from 222km to 177km.10 The new 
track is designed exclusively for passenger transport and allows train velocities of up to 300km/h. 
Due to both facts, travel time between the two main stations was reduced from 2h13 to 59min (Brux, 
2002). Preparatory works for the construction of the HSR started in December 1995. The major con-
struction work —on the various tunnels and bridges— began in 1998. The HSR line was completed 
at the end of 2001. After a test period the HSR line was put into operation in 2002. The total cost of 
the project was 6 billion Euros (European Commission, 2005, p. 17). 
The broader areas of Rhine-Ruhr and Rhine-Main have long been considered to be the largest Ger-
man economic agglomerations. The rail lines connecting the two centers along both Rhine riverbanks 
were among the European rail corridors with the heaviest usage. They had represented a traditional 
bottleneck since the early 1970s, when usage already exceeded capacity. The first plans for con-
                                                             
10  The straight-line distance between Cologne Main Station and Frankfurt Main Station is 152km. 
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structing an HSR line between Cologne and Frankfurt, consequently, date back to as far as the early 
1970s. Since then, it has taken more than 30 years until the opening. A reason for the long time peri-
od was the complex evolution process of infrastructure projects in Germany. Several variants at the 
left-hand and right-hand side of the Rhine were discussed during the decades of negotiations. Taking 
into account the difficult geography of the Central German Uplands, it was ultimately decided to con-
struct a right-hand side connection that would largely follow the highway A3 in an attempt to mini-
mize construction and environmental costs as well as travel time between the major centers. These 
benefits came at the expense of leaving relatively large cities like Koblenz and the state capitals 
Wiesbaden (Hesse) and Mainz (Rhineland Palatinate) aside.  
Due to the federal system of the Federal Republic of Germany the states (Länder) have a strong influ-
ence on infrastructure projects that affect their territories (Sartori, 2008, pp. 3-8). Three federal 
states were concerned with the subject project: North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatine, and 
Hesse. While Cologne lies in North Rhine-Westphalia and Frankfurt is located in Hesse, no stop was 
planned within the state of Rhineland-Palatine after the plans to connect Koblenz were abandoned in 
1989. The announcement of the exact routing, however, suddenly opened opportunities for commu-
nities along the line to lobby in favor of their connection. Limburg, supported by Hesse, was the first 
city to make a case. Somewhat later in the process, the local political and economic actors in Mon-
tabaur also managed to convince the state authorities of Rhineland-Palatinate to support their case. 
It was argued that from Montabaur the hinterland of the state could be connected via an existing 
regional line. The case of Montabaur was facilitated by the decision to build the new Limburg station 
at the south-eastern fringe of the city in Eschhofen. The originally proposed site (Limburg Staffel) 
was significantly closer than Montabaur and, given the already short distance, would have made an 
additional stop in Montabaur almost impossible to justify. During a long lobbying process menacing a 
blockade of the planning and political decision process, the three federal states eventually negotiated 
three intermediate stops along the HSR line, one in each of the concerned federal states. While 
Bonn/Siegburg and Limburg represented the shares of North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse, a new 
station in Montabaur ensured the connection of Rhineland-Palatinate.  
At the end of this process, Montabaur, with a population of less than 20,000 – the by far smallest city 
on the German high-speed rail network – found itself within 40 minutes of the regional centers Co-
logne and Frankfurt and within 20 minutes of the international airports Frankfurt and Cologne-Bonn. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this exceptional upgrade in terms of accessibility improved the 
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attractiveness of the city as a business location. A new congress center was opened and more than 50 
firms settled in an industrial park built adjacent to the rail station;11 1&1, a leading provider of com-
munication services, even moved their headquarters to that location. A number of local manufactur-
ing companies in the wider catchment area expanded their capacities in response to the improve-
ment in connectivity (Egenolf, 2008). Mainstream media reported a major success story as early as 
2007, citing city officials who claim that the HSR brought at least 600 new jobs to the town (Sorge, 
2007). Since then, the number has climbed to 1,800 (Hergert, 2015). Several newspapers cite execu-
tives of various local firms such as 1&1 (telecommunications), Emc2 (consulting), Friedhelm-Loh 
(electrical engineering), ADG (congress centre), Itac (software) MTE Deutschland (milling machines) 
all of which suggest that the HSR was a major factor in their decisions to locate or expand business 
activity in Montabaur (Hergert, 2015; Rhein-Zeitung, 2012; Sorge, 2007). As an example, ADG repre-
sentatives highlight that the new congress center would not have been viable without the fast con-
nection (less than 30 minutes) to the major airports (Frankfurt and Cologne/Bonn). Among the ma-
jor advantages reported were the ease of maintaining business relations and an improved access to a 
highly qualified labor pool. Various representatives, from Itac, 1&1, and others, stress that the HSR 
enables them to draw from a much larger labor market, which now includes the major agglomera-
tions Cologne and Frankfurt. In selected firms, more than 80% of the managerial positions are held 
by in-commuters. As an example, two-thirds of the 1,600 employees working for 1&1 commute into 
town, most of them by HSR (Hergert, 2015). These newspaper reports align well with the mayor’s 
HSR impact summary. According to Edmund Schaaf, employment has increased by 1,400 jobs (sub-
ject to social insurance contributions) over the past 15 years, which is almost 10 times the increase 
in population of 150.  
Altogether, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the unexpectedly high passenger numbers of 3,000 
per day, about 10 times the original forecasts (Müller, 2012), are driven by people working, not liv-
ing, in the city. This pattern is also consistent with the numbers reported for Limburg, where over 
the same period the number of in-commuters increased from 13,000 to 17,500 (Hergert, 2015). 
                                                             
11  Among them: Landesbetrieb Mobilität RLP Autobahnamt, Unternehmensberatung EMC², Industrie- und 
Handelskammer (IHK), Ingenieurgesellschaft Ruffert und Partner, Objektverwalter S.K.E.T, Cafe Latino, Kan-
tine Genuss & Harmonie. 
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Notwithstanding this local impact, the intermediate stops have been very controversial in terms of 
their economic viability. The cities of Montabaur and Limburg only exhibit approx. 12,500 and 
34,000 habitants. Furthermore, the distance between these two small cities is barely 20km and the 
high-speed ICE train needs only nine minutes between both stops, which is in contrast to the concept 
of high-velocity travelling that has its comparative advantages at much larger distances. The ad-
vantage of this institutional setting for our empirical analysis is that it is reasonable to assume that 
the routing of the track was exogenous in the sense that it was determined by geographical con-
straints, construction costs, and environmental concerns. Compared to the considered alternative 
route discussed in more detail in Section 3-C, the population living within the immediate catchment 
areas of the intermediate stops along the selected route amounts to less than a half.12 The locations of 
the eventually chosen intermediate stops was constrained by the proposed routing and the need to 
accommodate three stops at reasonable distances in three different federal states, disentangling po-
litical lobbying for intermediate stops from other regional policies. Most importantly, the connection 
of the intermediate stations was not driven by existing or expected demand – in fact, these stations 
were heavily opposed by the operating rail carrier Deutsche Bahn.  
Thus, we consider the resulting variation in accessibility provided by the rail line as exogenous to the 
economic outcomes we observe. Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue that the timing of the inaugu-
ration was exogenous to contemporary economic trends for the entire line. When the plans for a 
connection of Frankfurt and Cologne were first drafted in the 1970s it was virtually impossible to 
foresee changes in economic conditions in the late 1990s.  
                                                             
12  Using GIS we find a 2002 population of 438,540 living within 10 km from Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg, 
while 1,020,474 residents lived within the same distance from Bonn, Koblenz and Wiesbaden. All distances 
are measured between municipality centroids as the crow flies.  
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Fig. 1 The transport infrastructure in the study area  
 
Notes:  Market potential based on Eq. (4-2) and the decay parameter estimate (δ2) from Table 5, column (1). 
B – Data and study area 
Our study area comprises the German federal states Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-
Palatinate, to which the HSR connects. In 1996, six years before the opening of the HSR, the total 
population of the study area was about 28 million, thus somewhat less than California and about the 
size of Belgium and the Netherlands together. The share at the total German population was about 
34%. The share at German GDP was slightly higher at 36%. For the 115 counties (NUTS3 regions) in 
the three federal states we collect data from various official sources: GDP, population, GVA by indus-
try sectors from the German Federal Statistical Office;13 number of in- and out-commuter, employ-
ment (at workplace and residence) and share of workforce holding an academic degree (at work-
place) from the Federal Employment Agency. Municipality level population is obtained from The 
                                                             
13  These data are available at the website www.regionalstatistik.de. 
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Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning. We use these data primarily to identify the most 
important cities within each county, which we define as their economic centers. We collected data 
from 1992–1995 (depending on data availability) to 2009. The average county in our study area in 
1996 had a population of about 241k, which is significantly larger than the average county in the rest 
of the country (157k). In terms of output per worker, our study area is fairly similar to the rest of the 
country (€71.5k vs. €70.8). Also, the shares of various industries at the regional GVA are remarkably 
similar. Descriptive statistics are presented in Section 2 of the appendix, where we also present a 
map that illustrates the location of the study area and the HSR within Germany. 
3 Program evaluation 
The intermediate stops Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg on the Cologne-Frankfurt HSR were, as 
we argue, an accidental result of political bargaining and not rational transport planning. The new 
stations thus provide plausibly exogenous variation in transport services that can be exploited to 
detect economic impact using established program evaluation techniques. In this section we analyze 
the economic effects of the opening of the HSR – the treatment – on the economies of the counties of 
the intermediate stops, the treated counties. Specifically, we compare the evolution of various eco-
nomic outcome measures in the treated counties to control counties that provide a counterfactual.  
A – Treated vs. synthetic counties 
We note that at this stage we ignore Cologne and Frankfurt because these regional centers are argu-
ably major generators of transport demand, so the routing of the high-speed rail line cannot be con-
sidered exogenous to their economic performance. As these cities potentially benefit from improved 
transport services we also exclude them from the group of control counties. Besides, on the exogenei-
ty of the treatment the credibility of a quasi-experimental comparison rests on the assumption that 
the treatment and control group would have followed the same trend in the absence of the treat-
ment. To ensure a valid comparison we create a comparison group consisting of three synthetic 
counties, one for each of the treated counties in which the HSR stops Limburg, Montabaur, and Sieg-
burg are located. With this approach, we avoid problems arising in conventional difference-in-
differences analysis if the number of treated subjects is small relative to the number of control sub-
jects (Colin Cameron & Miller, 2015). We follow the procedure developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003), who define a synthetic region as a weighted combination of non-treated regions. The optimal 
combination of weights is determined by two objectives.  
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First, a synthetic county should match its treated counterpart as closely as possible in terms of the 
following economic growth predictors: GDP per worker, population density, ratio of out-commuters 
over in-commuters, the shares of construction, mining, services, retail, manufacturing, and finance at 
gross value added, and the share of workers holding a university degree in the workforce at work-
place. Formally, this problem is defined as min
𝑊∈𝑊
(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)´𝑉(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊), where W is a vector of 
non-negative weights of the non-treated counties in the synthetic county that must sum to one, X1 is a 
vector of pre-opening values of k economic growth predictors for the treated county, X0 is a matrix 
containing the same information for the non-treated counties, and V is a diagonal matrix with non-
negative elements that determine the relative importance of the growth predictors.  
The solution to this problem, the vector of optimal weights of non-treated counties W*, depends on V, 
which leads to the second objective. We search for the optimal combination V* which produces a 
synthetic control county that best matches the respective treated county in terms of the pre-
construction growth trend. Formally, this second problem is defined as 𝑉∗ = argmin
𝑉∈𝜈
(𝑍1 −
𝑍0𝑊
∗(𝑉))´(𝑍1 − 𝑍0𝑊
∗(𝑉)), where Z1 a is vector of pre-construction observations of an economic 
outcome measure Y for the treated county and Z0 is a matrix with the same information for the non-
treated counties.14  
Table 1 summarizes the pre-treatment characteristics of the home counties of the intermediate HSR 
stops, the synthetic control counties and all other non-treated counties in the study areas. Each syn-
thetic county is the result of a separate implementation of the procedure outlined above. In each case 
the economic outcome measure Y, used to find the optimal weights matrix 𝑊∗ is the log of GDP. The 
pre-period covers all years prior to 1998, when the substantial construction works began and after – 
more than 25 years of negotiations – confidence was created so that the HSR would eventually mate-
rialize. The values for the k growth predictors for a given synthetic county are given by the vector 
𝑋1
∗ = 𝑋0𝑊
∗, i.e., a weighted combination of non-treated counties. The treated counties (and the syn-
thetic counties) are characterized by below-average productivity, tend to be residential locations, 
and have a low share of workers holding university degrees. With few exceptions, the synthetic coun-
ties resemble their treated counterparts closely in observable characteristics, certainly more closely 
than the average of the non-treated counties.  
                                                             
14  We use the Stata ado file synth compiled by Hainmueller, Abadie, and Diamond to generate the synthetic 
control counties. 
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Tab. 1 Pre-treatment characteristics: Treated vs. synthetic controls 
 
Limburg-
Weilburg 
(Limburg) 
Westerwald-
kreis 
(Montabaur) 
Rhein-
Siegkreis 
(Siegburg) 
All non-
treated  
counties 
Predictor variable Treat Synth Treat Synth  Treat Synth  Mean S.D. 
GDP/worker (€) 63.8k 69.0k 64.9k 64.5k 74.9k 74.7k 69.3k 7.9k 
Ratio out/in-commuting 0.51 0.30 0.51 0.50 0.36 0.38 1.09 1.00 
Population/sq. km land area 227 424 193 178 464 463 771 813 
Industry share: Const. 4.6% 4.6% 4.0% 4.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 1.1% 
Industry share: Mining 9.2% 9.2% 14.1% 13.9% 10.8% 10.8% 13.7% 5.1% 
Industry share: Services 36.2% 36.2% 31.9% 31.7% 36.2% 36.1% 33.5% 4.9% 
Industry share: Retail 8.0% 8.9% 8.7% 8.7% 8.5% 8.5% 8.8% 2.1% 
Industry share: Manufact. 13.8% 13.8% 18.1% 18.0% 13.8% 13.7% 16.5% 4.9% 
Industry share: Finance 16.1% 15.9% 12.1% 12.0% 15.1% 15.0% 12.8% 2.8% 
Share higher education  5.1% 4.7% 3.7% 3.6% 6.7% 6.7% 6.5% 3.1% 
Notes: The reported values are means across all years prior to 1998 (when construction began) except for 
the share of workers (at workplace) holding a university degree, which refers to 1999, the earliest 
year for which data was available. 
The weighting has achieved its first-order purpose of creating comparison counties that are more 
similar to the treated than the naïve control group of all non-treated counties. None of the synthetic 
counties depend solely on one county, nor are the important donors (with high weights) within a 
likely spillover range (see section 3-A in the appendix). We are thus ready to use the weights matri-
ces (one for each treated county) to approximate vectors of counterfactual outcomes for the synthet-
ic counties. We begin with Westerwaldkreis, home to the HSR stop Montabaur. As introduced in Sec-
tion 2, Montabaur features particularly prominently in the media as an example of how communities 
can benefit from access to HSR. Using log GDP as an outcome variable, the left panel of Figure 2 com-
pares the actual realizations (solid lines) to a vector of counterfactual values (dashed line) for the 
synthetic control county 𝑌1
∗ = 𝑌0𝑊
∗, where 𝑌0 is a matrix containing the economic outcomes of all 
non-treated counties for all years. Both trend lines are normalized to zero in the first period. Up to 
1998 the two lines follow each other closely, which indicates that the weighting also achieved the 
second-order purpose of equalizing pre-trends. After 1998 actual economic growth surpasses the 
counterfactual growth, in particular during the construction period. This pattern is indicative of 
some anticipation effects. Some firms moved to or expanded their businesses before the station was 
actually served, perhaps in an attempt to seek first-mover advantages and occupy the best possible 
spots in the business park close to the station. 
To gain further insights into other dimensions of economic impact we have used the procedure out-
lined above to create synthetic control counties and counterfactual trends for each of the three treat-
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ed counties and a number of alternative outcomes. The right panel in Figure 2 exemplarily illustrates 
the resulting trend lines for the actual and the counterfactual log number of in-commuters in West-
erwaldkreis. This comparison substantiates the impression that the county was perceived as an eco-
nomically more attractive location once it was clear that it would be connected to the HSR line.  
Figure 3 provides an overview of the various comparisons between the actual and counterfactual 
trends we did for the three treated counties and six alternative outcome measures. In each panel we 
plot the differences between the trend lines (actual – counterfactual) for a different outcome meas-
ure. We further add an extrapolated linear trend fitted into the pre (before 1998) observations to 
allow for an intuitive comparison of the relative trends before and after construction began.  
The positive impacts on economic activity suggested by Figure 2 for Montabaur seem to generalize to 
the two other intermediate stops. We find positive deviations from the relative pre-trend in GDP af-
ter the construction began (Limburg) or the line was completed (Siegburg). Similar positive turns in 
relative trends are evident in the share of in-commuters. The other outcome measures yield more 
mixed patterns and, in general, suggest that the HSR increased the attractiveness of the three affected 
counties as places to work rather than places to live.  
Fig. 2 Westerwaldkreis (Montabaur) vs. synthetic control county 
Ln GDP 
 
Ln number of in-commuters 
 
Notes: Solid (dashed) line shows the trend line for Westerwaldkreis where Montabaur is situated (the syn-
thetic control county). Vertical lines indicate the period of substantial construction activity. Years up 
to 1997 were used in the construction of the weights matrix underlying the synthetic county. 
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Fig. 3 Relative trends for treated counties vs. synthetic control counties 
  
  
  
Notes: Solid lines represent the differences between the trend lines for a treated county and the synthetic 
control county. Vertical lines indicate the period of substantial construction activity. Years up to 
1997 were used in the construction of the weights matrices underlying the synthetic counties. 
Dashed lines are extrapolated linear fits using observations before 1998. 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen – From periphery to core 17 
 
B – Econometric analysis 
For a more formal test of the economic impact of the HSR on the group of treated counties we make 
use of the following difference-in-differences (DD) specification: 
log(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝜃[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 > 2002)𝑡] + ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998
+ ϑ[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 − 2003)𝑡]
+ ϑP[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 − 2003)𝑡×(𝑡 > 2002)𝑡] + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(3-1) 
, where i and t index counties (treated and non-treated) and years, 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy variable that is one 
for the treated counties of Montabaur, Limburg, and Siegburg and zero otherwise, (𝑡 > 2002) simi-
larly indexes years after 2002, (𝑡 = 𝑛) similarly indexes a year n, (𝑡 − 2003) is a yearly trend taking a 
value of zero in 2003, and 𝜇𝑖  and 𝜑𝑡 are county and year fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a random error term. 
This specification allows for a short-run impact on the level of the economic outcome variable 
(𝜃[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 > 2002)𝑡]) as well as a long-run impact on its trend (ϑ
P[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 − 2003)𝑡×(𝑡 >
2002)𝑡]) while controlling for heterogeneity in pre-trends across the treated and the control coun-
ties (ϑ[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 − 2003)𝑡]). The cumulated percentage impact in a given (post) year is defined as 
exp (𝜃 + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. 15 The new stations have provided transport services since 2002, but a 
high degree of confidence regarding the eventual completion of the line have existed since 1998 
when the substantial construction works began. We therefore add a number of short-run DD terms 
∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998  which absorb the effects during the construction period so that our treat-
ment estimates are based on a comparison between the pre-construction (t<1998) to the post-
completion period (t>2002). Essentially, the model produces empirical estimates of the cumulated 
effect (and its significance) which correspond to the differences between the solid and the dashed 
lines in Figure 3 during the post period. Standard errors are clustered on counties to account for se-
rial correlation as recommended by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).  
We begin with the presentation of the empirical results for the outcome measure log GDP in Table 2. 
We use the groups of all non-treated (1–3) as well as the synthetic counties (4–6) as control groups 
and, in each case, complement the presentation of the results of the full models (3) and (6) with sim-
plified versions of the model. Columns (1) and (4) provide a simple mean comparison (conditional on 
county and year fixed effects) of the difference in log GDP across the groups of treated and non-
                                                             
15  The respective standard error is exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + (𝑡 − 2003)2×var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen – From periphery to core 18 
 
treated as well as the pre (before 2003) and post (from 2003 onwards) periods. Columns (2) and (5) 
control for effects during the construction years, but do not control for trends.  
The results, relatively consistently point to a positive and significant impact of the HSR on GDP. Ig-
noring trends, GDP in the treated counties grew by about 7% more in the treated counties than in the 
remaining ones if the comparison is made between the periods before construction began and after 
construction ended (2). The effect is slightly larger than in the basic model (1), which is consistent 
with the anticipation effects found in the visual inspection of the trend lines. The effect is also rough-
ly in line with the average differences between the actual relative trend (solid lines) and linearly ex-
trapolation pre-trends (dashed lines) during the post-period in the upper-left panel of Figure 3. Once 
we control for relative trends, the treatment effect disappears. As there is no positive impact on 
(post) trends, the implication is that the model attributes the relative differences between the before 
and after period to heterogeneous trends that existed prior to the treatment.  
Our preferred models, which compare the trends in the treated counties to the synthetic counties, 
yield a somewhat different picture. Consistently, all models (4–6) point to a GDP growth in the group 
of treated counties that exceeds the control group by about 5% in the short run. The full model (6) 
also suggests a positive long-run impact on the GDP trend, which is just about not statistically signifi-
cant. The cumulated effects after three (2006) and six (2009) years, which are a combination of the 
short-run level and long-run trend effects amount to statistically significant effects of about 6.5–8.5% 
and are thus within the range of the effects suggested by Table 2, column (2) and Figure 3 (upper-
left). The estimates reported in Table 2 are robust to using different donor pools (counties from 
which the algorithm can draw) and predictors (covariates the algorithm seeks to balance) (see sec-
tion 3-B in the appendix).  
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Tab. 2 Treatment effect on GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln GDP 
Control group Non-treated counties Synthetic counties 
T x (YEAR>2002) 
[𝜃] 
0.057*** 
(0.006) 
0.072*** 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
0.049** 
(0.014) 
0.051** 
(0.016) 
0.046* 
(0.018) 
T x (YEAR>2002) x 
(YEAR-2003) [𝜗P] 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.003) 
Cumulated effect   -0.003   0.066* 
after 3 years   (0.017)   (0.027) 
Cumulated effect   -0.005   0.084* 
after 6 years   (0.024)   (0.036) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constr. years x T  - YES YES - YES YES 
T x (YEAR-2003) - - YES - - YES 
r2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999 
N 2034 2034 2034 108 108 108 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on counties. T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the 
treated counties. Cumulated effects computed as exp (?̂? + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. Cumulated standard 
errors computed as exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + (𝑡 − 2003)2×var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. Constr, 
years x T indicates treatment T x year n interaction terms ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998 . * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01  
In Table 3 we replicate the least (1) and most (6) demanding models from Table 2 separately for 
each of the treated counties. We find positive effects on each of the treated counties, which are 
roughly within the range of the effects derived from the pooled models. After six years, each of the 
treated counties exceeded its synthetic counterpart by about 7–10% in terms of GDP.  
Table 4, applies the most demanding specification (comparison to synthetic control counties control-
ling for trends) to different outcome measures. We find a positive and statistically significant effect 
on per-worker GDP, which is roughly within the range of the GDP impact just discussed. Economic 
growth thus seems to have come at least in part, if not entirely, through an increase in productivity 
(of the labor force). It is noteworthy, however, that the naïve DD specification (used in Table 2, col-
umn 2) yields significantly positive effects on per-worker GDP and workplace employment of rough-
ly similar magnitude (see appendix section 3-C). The naïve DD specification also adds to the results 
reported Table 4, column 5 in that the positive point estimate of the in-commuter effect is statistical-
ly significant. This is in line with the results of a complementary analysis of bilateral commuting 
flows within the study area summarized in Figure 4 and laid out in more detail in appendix section 3-
E. Confirming the anecdotal evidence reported in section 2-A, the analysis shows that firms in Mon-
tabaur and Limburg have been drawing employees from a wider labor market since the opening of 
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the HSR. The analysis also reveals that at the intensive margin (variation in reduction of commuting 
times), there seems to be a HSR effect on out-commuting. 
Overall, the results of the econometric analysis support the key finding of the visual trend inspection 
that the HSR increased the attractiveness of the locations close to the intermediate stations as places 
to work, but not necessarily as places to live. A further breakdown by industry (in section 3-D in the 
appendix) shows that treatment effects are driven by financial services and other non-public ser-
vices. This confirms anecdotal evidence citing the positive effects on firms specializing in consulting 
(Emc2), telecommunications (1&1), software (Itac) or events (ADG).  
Tab. 3 Treatment effects on GDP by treated county 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln GDP 
 Limburg-Weilburg 
(Limburg) 
Westerwaldkreis 
(Montabaur) 
Rhein-Siegkreis 
(Siegburg) 
Control group Non-treat. Synthetic Non-treat. Synthetic Non-treat. Synthetic 
TREAT x (YEAR>2002) 
[𝜃] 
0.056*** 
(0.006) 
0.033** 
(0.010) 
0.058*** 
(0.006) 
0.049 
(0.030) 
0.057*** 
(0.006) 
0.057** 
(0.023) 
TREAT x (YEAR>2002) 
x (YEAR-2003) [𝜗P] 
 
 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Cumulated effect  0.050***  0.073*  0.074** 
after 3 years  (0.009)  (0.039)  (0.026) 
Cumulated effect  0.067***  0.097*  0.089** 
after 6 years  (0.013)  (0.049)  (0.031) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constr. years x T  - YES - YES - YES 
T x (YEAR-2003) - YES - YES - YES 
r2 0.997 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.997 1.000 
N 1998 36 1998 36 1998 36 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust in (2), (4) and (6) and clustered on counties in (1), (3), 
and (5). T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the treated counties. Cumulated effects computed as 
exp (?̂? + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. Cumulated standard errors computed as exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + (𝑡 − 2003)2×
var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. Constr, years x T indicates treatment T x year n interaction 
terms ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998 . * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Tab. 4 Treatment effect on other economic outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln GDP/ 
worker 
Ln Work-
place em-
ployment 
Ln Resi-
dence em-
ployment 
Ln 
Population 
Ln No of in-
commuters 
Ln No of 
out-
commuters 
Control group Synthetic counties 
T x (YEAR>2002) 
[𝜃] 
0.056*** 
(0.010) 
-0.020 
(0.032) 
-0.025 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
0.030 
(0.086) 
-0.015 
(0.030) 
T x (YEAR>2002) x 
(YEAR-2003) [𝜗P] 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Cumulated effect 0.065** -0.023 -0.040** -0.022 0.062 -0.035 
after 3 years (0.021) (0.050) (0.014) (0.021) (0.123) (0.039) 
Cumulated effect 0.072* -0.025 -0.055** -0.034 0.095 -0.055 
after 6 years (0.034) (0.069) (0.015) (0.026) (0.158) (0.049) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constr. years x T  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x (YEAR-2003) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
r2 0.983 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.999 
N 102 102 102 120 96 96 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on counties. T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the 
treated counties. Cumulated effects computed as exp (?̂? + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. Cumulated standard 
errors computed as exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + (𝑡 − 2003)2×var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. Constr, 
years x T indicates treatment T x year n interaction terms ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998 . * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Fig. 4 HSR effects on bilateral commuting flows from and to HSR municipalities 
 
Notes: In-commuter models use flows from all municipalities in the study area into intermediate HSR  mu-
nicipalities. Out-commuter models use flows from intermediate HSR municipalities to all municipali-
ties in the study area. First difference in # of commuters is the difference between the average num-
ber of commuters from 1992–1995 and the average number of commuters from 2010–2012. First 
difference in travel time is based on the transport cost matrices summarized in Figure  4. Observa-
tions weighted by the average number of commuters (across all period).  
C – Falsification 
As with any program evaluation the key identification challenge in our empirical exercise is to find a 
credible counterfactual for the treated group. To ensure a valid comparison we have constructed a 
synthetic control group which resembles the treated counties in terms of observable characteristics 
and pre-treatment trends. In addition, we have made use of an econometric model that controls for 
heterogeneity in pre-trends between the treated and the control counties. We argue that this degree 
of sophistication helps to reduce the risk of erroneously attributing different macroeconomic trends 
that result from differences between the groups of treated and control counties to the HRS. But we 
acknowledge that there is, ultimately, no formal way of affirming that the true counterfactual trend 
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has been established. What can be done is to evaluate the likelihood that our empirical design reveals 
a treatment effect where, in effect, there is no treatment. We summarize the results of three falsifica-
tion tests here and refer to the appendix (sections 3-F, 3-G, 3-H) for a detailed discussion. 
We begin with a classic “placebo” study. We apply our empirical strategy to an HSR which was con-
sidered during the planning stage but never built. The track would also have had three intermediate 
stops in each of the involved federal states and would have passed through the economically and 
politically relevant cities of Bonn (the former federal capital located in North Rhine-Westphalia), 
Koblenz (the largest city in northern Rhineland-Palatinate) and Wiesbaden (the state capital of Hes-
se). The results are easily summarized. The mean treatment effect on the GDP across the three cities 
is near to and not statistically different from zero in all specifications. The separate treatment esti-
mates by treated county produce significant estimates with mixed signs in the naïve DD specification, 
but no significant cumulative effects using synthetic counties as comparisons (although Wiesbaden 
has a near to 10% significance level positive long-run effect). We don’t find any significant effect of 
the other outcome measures either, although there are large and positive point estimates for per-
worker GDP (but even larger standard errors).  
Focusing on GDP as an outcome measure, we next conduct a placebo test in the spirit of Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). For every county in the donor pool (non-HSR counties), we use a 
synthetic county generated by the same method as in the baseline model to estimate a placebo 
treatment effect. We find that the actual average treatment effect (across the three intermediate 
towns) is outside the 90% confidence interval in the right tail of the distribution of placebo treat-
ment effects (1,000 random combinations of three placebo-treated counties). The key insight from 
this placebo test is that the method employed is unlikely to yield treatment effects similar to the ones 
estimated for the HSR counties by chance. This, placebo test, however, could be favorable to the actu-
al treated counties because these are not randomly located in space. Instead, the treated counties are 
within a relatively close distance (compared to the average distance between counties in the study 
area) located almost exactly along a straight line. It is therefore more likely that unobserved spatially 
correlated characteristics have a similar impact on economic trends of the actual treated counties 
than for the randomly selected placebo-treated counties.  
To address this concern, we refine the selection process of placebo-treated counties to make the test 
more demanding. Again, we run a series of 1,000 similar models, however, this time requiring that 
the placebo-treated counties are connected by a placebo HSR. In each iteration of the placebo test, we 
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first randomly select one county as one endpoint of a placebo HSR (the placebo Cologne). Second, we 
randomly select another endpoint (the placebo Frankfurt) from all counties within a 140–180km 
range (in terms of straight-line distances) of the first endpoint (the distance between Cologne and 
Frankfurt is 160km). Third, we pick the three counties whose economic center (the largest city) is 
closest to a straight line connecting the two endpoints and define them as the treated counties (the 
placebo intermediate stops). Fourth, we create synthetic comparison counties for each of the place-
bo-treated counties according to our standard procedure. Fifth, we estimate the naïve DD model (Ta-
ble 2, column 3 model, which uses all non-treated control counties and does not control for trends) 
as well as our preferred model (Table 2, column 6 model, which uses synthetic control counties and 
controls for trends) and save the point estimates and significance levels. Of the 1,000 tests 8.4% 
(24%) deliver significant treatment effects after six years using our preferred (naïve) DD model. 
5.6% (8.2%) iterations resulted in treatment effects that were significant (at the 10% level) and at 
least as large as our benchmark estimates. The mean of the point estimate is very close to zero. Nota-
bly, the standard deviation across placebo point estimates with 8.6% (5.4%) is relatively large com-
pared to our 8.4% (5.7%) treatment estimate. We conclude that it is unlikely that our empirical spec-
ification delivers significant treatment effects that are spurious.  
4 Agglomeration effects 
Given the results presented so far it seems fair to conclude that the HSR has had a positive impact on 
the economies of the counties of the intermediate stops. This impact is in line with the idea that an 
increase in (market) accessibility should increase the attractiveness of a location as a place of pro-
duction. In the next step we seek to model the change in accessibility pattern induced by the HSR 
more fully to gain insights into the strength and the spatial scope of agglomeration forces.  
A – Empirical strategy 
In our baseline empirical model we assume that the output in county i in year t denoted by 𝑄𝑖𝑡 de-
pends on effective density 𝐷𝑖𝑡 as well as arbitrary county effects 𝑐𝑖 and year effects dt. 
ln(𝑄𝑖𝑡) = 𝛿1 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4-1) 
, where 𝛿1 is the elasticity of output with respect to effective density for marginal changes in D and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is a random error. We hypothesize that, all else equal, access to a larger economic mass should in-
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crease firm productivity and lead to higher economic output. We model effective density as a func-
tion of output across all counties j within reach and, thus, assume a black-box agglomeration force 
that depends on the productivity of all non-land inputs. Specifically, we allow for bilateral productivi-
ty externalities between all counties, assuming that the spillover effect declines exponentially in a 
measure of effective distance Eij between regions i and j, which takes into account the availability of 
transport infrastructure. Our measure of effective density thus takes the market potential form 
(Harris, 1954), which is popular in the theoretical (Fujita & Ogawa, 1982; Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg, 
2002) and empirical (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2013) agglomeration economics 
literature. Similar measures have been used in the empirical NEG literature (Hanson, 2005; Redding 
& Sturm, 2008). 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑄𝑗𝑒
−𝛿2𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑗
 (4-2) 
, where 𝛿2>0 determines the rate of spatial decay of the productivity effect in effective distance be-
tween two regions i and j.16 The strength of the market potential formulation is that it effectively al-
lows the productivity effect of spatial externalities to vary in effective distance to the surrounding 
economic mass without imposing arbitrary discrete classifications. Instead of assuming that exter-
nalities operate within the administrative borders of a region or contiguous groups of regions, our 
measure of effective density also accounts for externalities across such borders.  
Estimating the parameters of interest 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 is challenging for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it is 
difficult to control for all location factors subsumed in ci , which impact on productivity and are po-
tentially correlated with the agglomerations measure. Secondly, there is a mechanical endogeneity 
problem because the dependent variable output (Qit) also appears in the market potential of regions 
i=j. Unobserved shocks to output can therefore lead to a spurious correlation between the outcome 
measure and effective density. The problem is non-trivial given that internal effective distance Eij=i is 
typically short so that the Qij=i receives a relatively high weight. Thirdly, it is likely that shocks to out-
puts are spatially correlated so that the same problem also applies to nearby areas i and j.  
                                                             
16  Our internal effective distance Eij=i depends on the land area of county i so that our measure corresponds to a 
standard density measure for the within county externalities.  
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The first problem can be addressed by estimating equation (4-1) in differences so that unobserved 
time-invariant location factors are differentiated out as, for example, in Hanson (2005). Informed by 
the program evaluation results, we take long differences over the construction period from 1998 to 
2002 in our baseline estimation, but we consider alternative end dates in an alternative specification. 
The second problem, in principle, can be mitigated by aggregating right-hand side areas j to larger 
spatial units (e.g. Hanson, 2005) or replacing Qij=i with imputed values (Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2013). 
Both strategies come at the cost of losing information. The third problem is even more difficult to 
address since shocks to output at nearby regions are likely correlated not only in levels but also in 
trends.  
Our empirical strategy addresses the abovementioned problems by exploiting the variation in bilat-
eral transport times created by the HSR. We set the output levels at all locations j to 𝑄𝑗𝑡=1998 in both 
periods, so that the identification comes exclusively from changes in effective distance. Our estima-
tion equation thus takes the following form: 
ln(𝑄𝑖,𝑡=2002) − ln(𝑄𝑖,𝑡=1998) = 𝛿0 + δ1
[
 
 
 
 ln (∑ 𝑄𝑗,𝑡=1998𝑒
−𝛿2𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=2002
𝑗
)
− ln (∑ 𝑄𝑗,𝑡=1998𝑒
−𝛿2𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=1998
𝑗
)
]
 
 
 
 
+ ∆𝜀𝑖 (4-3) 
We stress that this specification differs from a conventional first-difference approach in that the first-
difference in the market potential is driven by changes in the travel time, but not output. Specifica-
tion (4-3) is estimated using a non-linear least squares estimator to simultaneously determine both 
parameters of interest (δ1 and δ2). With the estimated parameters it is then possible to express the 
effect of an increase in economic mass at j by one unit of initial market potential of county i on the 
outcome of county i as a function of the bilateral effective distance: 
𝜕log (𝑄𝑖)
𝜕(𝑄𝑗)
×(∑ 𝑄𝑗𝑒
−𝛿2𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑗
) = δ1̂exp (−𝛿2̂𝐸𝑖𝑗) 
(4-4) 
Similar increases in economic mass are expected to benefit a county more if it happens in a county 
within a shorter effective distance.  
We consider several alterations of specification (4-3) for the purposes of validation, falsification, and 
evaluation of robustness. We estimate equation (4-3) using the GVA in various industry sectors as an 
outcome variable. We consider a grid search over a large parameter space (𝛿1, 𝛿2) to evaluate wheth-
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er the agglomeration and spillover parameters are credibly separately identified. We contrast our 
results with those derived from a market potential specification that allows for more flexibility in the 
spatial decay. We allow for trends correlated with initial sectorial composition, workforce qualifica-
tion, and exposure to agglomeration. We also control for trends pre-existing the construction of the 
HSR and explore the temporal pattern of adjustment using an alternative panel specification. Im-
portantly, we use instrumental variables to restrict the identifying variation to the portion that is not 
only exogenous with respect to the timing, but also with respect to the routing of the HSR. For falsifi-
cation, we make use of the placebo HSR, which was considered but never built, and public sector GVA 
as an outcome, which we expect not to respond to the HSR, at least in the short run. Finally, we repli-
cate the main stages of the analysis using per-worker GDP as a dependent variable to connect more 
closely to the literature on the productivity effects of density. In this alternative specification we will 
also control for changes in the industry sector structure and workforce qualification to address selec-
tion effects. 
B – Approximation of effective distance 
To implement the empirical strategy laid out above we require empirical approximations of the bi-
lateral travel costs between each pair of counties in the study area, the effective distance. To compute 
our measures of effective distance we make use of a Geographic Information System (GIS) and the 
information on transport infrastructure displayed in Figure 1. In connecting two counties we refer to 
the largest cities within the pair of counties as the respective centers of economic mass (the black 
dots in Figure 1). In computing the effective distance we assume that transport costs are incurred 
exclusively in terms of travel time and that route choice is based on travel time minimization. The 
identifying variation stems exclusively from the HSR line in question. We abstract from any other 
change in transport technology. 
To solve for the least-cost matrix connecting all potential origins and destinations we assign travel 
times to each fraction of the transport network, which are based on the network distance and the 
following speeds: 160km/h for HSR, which is roughly in line with the 70min journey along the 
180km Cologne-Frankfurt HSR line; 80km/h for conventional rail, which is roughly in line with the 
140min journey along the 205km conventional rail line; 100km/h for motorways and 80km/h on the 
other primary roads. In combining these transport modes we experiment with different procedures. 
In our benchmark cost matrix we allow travellers to change from roads to conventional rail in any 
city (they all have rail stations) and from any mode to HSR at the dedicated HSR stations (white cir-
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cles in Figure 1) if in the respective period HSR is available. For robustness checks we compute travel 
times according to two alternative decision rules. In one version travellers can choose either the au-
tomobile or rail, including HSR if available, but they are not allowed to switch mode during a journey. 
In a further alternative we eliminate the automobile altogether. Since the automobile is typically the 
more competitive mode the resulting change in travel time reflects an upper bound of the true acces-
sibility gain.  
In each case, we approximate the average internal travel time within a region i=j as the travel time 
that corresponds to a journey at 80km/h (primary road) along a distance that corresponds to two-
thirds of the radius of a circle with the same surface area. 
Figure 5 summarizes the distribution of travel times across the 1152=13,225 county pairs in the situ-
ations with and without HRS according to the baseline decision rule and the rail-only alternative. 
Evidently, the introduction of HSR had a significant impact on the competitiveness of the rail network 
as reflected by the major shift in the distribution of rail travel times (dashed lines) toward the distri-
bution of road travel times (black solid line). Prior to HSR, the road network offered faster connec-
tions for almost all county pairs so that the road travel time matrix effectively describes the least-
cost matrix (black solid lines). As expected, adding HSR as a potential mode that can be combined 
with the automobile reduces travel times significantly on a number of routes, especially on those that 
would otherwise take 50min or more (red solid line).  
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Fig. 5 Distributions of bilateral travel times 
 
Notes: Black (red) solid line shows the distribution of bilateral travel times on roads (the fastest combina-
tion of car and rail including HSR). Black (red) dashed line shows the distributions for rail excluding 
(including) HSR. Vertical lines denote the respective means of the distributions.  
C – Market potential effects on output: Baseline results 
Column (1) in Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating the model given by Eq. (4-3) using ln 
regional GDP as the economic outcome. The estimates point to positive spillover effects, which decay 
in distance. Given an 18.5% elasticity of output with respect to market potential, a doubling in mar-
ket potential implies an increase in GDP by 20% (=exp(0.185)-1). The strength of spillovers decays 
by 2.3% every minute, which corresponds to a half-life travel time of about 30 minutes. It takes about 
200 minutes before the strength of the spillovers diminish to around 1%. The black line in Figure 6 
illustrates the implied productivity effect of an increase in economic mass at location j by one unit of 
total market potential at location i. Based on this estimated spatial decay, we illustrate the change in 
market potential in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, Montabaur (the primary town in its county) experi-
ences the largest accessibility gain from HSR. Combining the change in market potential by 0.34 log-
points with the estimated market potential elasticity the predicted increase in GDP for Montabaur is 
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about 6%, which is close to the cumulated effect after three years detected in the program evaluation 
section.  
The remaining columns in Table 5 present results according to Eq. (4-3) replacing regional GDP with 
the GVA of various industry sectors as the outcome variable. The estimated spillover effects are visu-
alized in Figure 6 as gray lines. The estimates are generally within the range of column (1). For some 
sectors the parameters are, however, estimated less precisely. The results also suggest that the mar-
ket potential elasticity estimated in column (1) is brought down somewhat by sectors that are appar-
ently less susceptible to agglomeration benefits, namely services other than financial services. For 
construction, mining, manufacturing, and financial services the elasticity of output with respect to 
market potential is relatively large.  
As the HSR line is used exclusively for passenger transport, we expect to capture Marshallian exter-
nalities related to human interactions. Candidates are knowledge spillovers due to formal and infor-
mal meetings, improved labor market access and matching, as well as improved access to intermedi-
ated goods and consumer markets to the extent that the ease of communication reduces transaction 
costs but not freight costs. Our results are thus principally comparable to Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and 
Ahlfeldt and Wendland (2013) who have estimated the effects of spillovers on productivity from 
within-city variation. These studies have found spillover effects that are significantly more localized. 
The spillover effect in these studies decay to near to zero within about half a kilometer, which is in 
line with Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) who also focus on within-city variation. Compared to these 
studies the lower spatial decay suggests that we are capturing different types of spatial externalities. 
While the steep spillover decay in the within-city studies points to a dominating role of face-to-face 
contacts that purposely or accidently happen at high frequency in the immediate neighborhood 
(Storper & Venables, 2004), our results suggest that the HSR effects operate at an intermediate range 
and through the benefits of shared inputs and labor pools, labor market matching or increases in 
consumer and producer market access. This interpretation is also in line with the significantly lower 
spatial decay found in an empirical NEG studies with an emphasis on trade costs (Hanson, 2005). 
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Tab. 5 Market potential effects on output by sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δln GDP 
1998-2002 
Δln GVA 
1998-2002 
Δln GVA 
1998-2002 
Δln GVA 
1998-2002 
Δln GVA 
1998-2002 
Δln GVA 
1998-2002 
Sector All Construc-
tion 
Mining Manufac-
turing 
Financial 
services 
Other  
services 
Δln Market po-
tential (𝛿1) 
0.185*** 
(0.051) 
0.360** 
(0.167) 
0.320** 
(0.124) 
0.331*** 
(0.118) 
0.379*** 
(0.116) 
0.155 
(0.094) 
Decay (𝛿2) 0.022** 0.021 0.033 0.032* 0.014 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) 
r2 0.054 0.036 0.030 0.037 0.050 0.021 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Notes: Estimation method is nonlinear least squares in all models.  Robust standard errors (in parentheses) 
of the market potential coefficient 𝛿1 are heteroscedasticity robust and computed in separate OLS 
regressions holding the decay parameters (𝛿2) constant at the levels estimated in the NLS models re-
ported in the table. The market potential of region i is the transport cost weighted sum of output in 
all regions j. The change in market potential is driven by changes in travel cost between regions ex-
clusively. Regional output is held constant at 1998 level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Fig. 6 Market potential effect on output by effective distance  
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the effect of a hypothetical increase in output at county j by one unit of initial mar-
ket potential at county i on log output of county i. The figure illustrates agglomeration spillover ef-
fects as defined as in Eq. (4-4). Estimates of 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 from Table 2. 
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D – Market potential effects on output: Validation, robustness, and falsification 
As in any market potential equation, the elasticity and decay parameters are not necessarily separa-
bly identified. In fact, it is only the (ad-hoc) functional form of the spatial decay imposed in the mar-
ket potential formulation (4-2) that allows us to separately estimate the market potential elasticity 
(𝛿1) and the decay parameter (𝛿2). In general terms, a larger decay parameter 𝛿2 implies that more 
distant regions enter the market potential with a lower weight, reducing the degree of implicit spatial 
smoothing. The resulting larger variation in the market potential normally implies a lower estimate 
of the elasticity parameter 𝛿1.  
Fig. 7 Market potential effect on output: Grid searches over parameter space  
 
Notes: Dark shades indicate a low root sum of square error in “predicted change log output” – “actual 
change log output”, where predicted change in log output and actual change in log output are nor-
malized to have a zero mean. A more detailed description of the objective function is in the appendix 
(section 4-A). Output is measured in GDP for all non-public sectors, and GVA for all other sectors. Ser-
vices exclude financial services (Finance) and public services. Class thresholds correspond to the 1st, 
5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentile in the distribution within the parameter 
space delta 2 = {0,0.1}. White circles denote NLS point estimates from Table 5. X-axis in ln scale. 
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As there could be multiple combinations of these critical parameters that fit the data we have run a 
grid-search over 500 possible values of 𝛿1 and 𝛿2(0.001 to 0.5) resulting in 250,000 parameter com-
binations for each of the models reported in Table 5. For each parameter combination, we compute 
the root sum of the square deviations between the observed and predicted changes in regional out-
put. As illustrated in Figure 7, we find relatively clearly defined global minima, supporting the para-
metric estimates presented in Table 5 and Figure 6. This robustness check using an alternative ap-
proach to identifying the elasticity and decay parameters increases our confidence in the point esti-
mates of the decay parameters estimated with large standard errors reported in Table 5. A more de-
tailed description of the objective function is in the appendix (section 4-A). 
In Table 6 we present a series of alterations of the baseline model in column (1) of Table 5. We fix the 
decay parameter to the value estimated in the baseline model (Table 5, column 1) so the market po-
tential elasticity remains comparable across alternative models. In columns (1–3) we control for 
trends that may be correlated with but are economically unrelated to the change in market potential 
and potentially confound the estimates. The purpose of these models is, thus, similar to the matching 
on observables we imposed in the construction of synthetic counties in the program evaluation sec-
tion. In model (4) we additionally control for the (1992 to 1997) pre-trend in log GDP to account for 
the possibility that unobserved county characteristics determine long-run growth trends.17 This con-
trol serves a similar purpose to the matching on pre-trends in the construction of the synthetic coun-
ties and the control for heterogeneity in pre-trends in the program evaluation DD model. The market 
potential elasticity decreases somewhat but remains significant and within the range of the baseline 
estimate. 
In model (5) we exploit that the timing and the routing of the HSR line can be assumed to be exoge-
nous for the intermediate stops (Limburg, Montabaur, Siegburg) while “only” the timing (and not the 
routing) is exogenous for the endpoints Cologne and Frankfurt. To restrict the variation in change in 
market potential to the fraction that is most plausibly exogenous we instrument the change in mar-
ket potential with three indicator variables, each denoting one of the counties in which the interme-
diate stops are located. The market potential elasticity remains significant, but decreases somewhat 
                                                             
17  We take the lagged log GDP long-difference over the period 1992–1997 instead of 1992–1998 to avoid a 
mechanical endogeneity problem that would arise if the 1998 log GDP was entered on both sides of the 
equation. 
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further to about 12.5%. The instruments are strong (F-Stat > 10) and while we prefer to justify the 
instruments on theoretical grounds (they restrict the identification to plausibly exogenous varia-
tion), we note that a Sargan-Hansen test does not reject validity. 
In model (6) we use GVA in the public sector instead of total GDP as the left-hand side measure of 
output. We view this model as a placebo test because the spatial distribution of this sector is unlikely 
to be determined by economic agglomeration forces, at least in the short run. In line with this inter-
pretation we find a non-statistically significant near to zero agglomeration effect.  
Tab. 6 Agglomeration effects: expanded models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Δln GDP all sectors 1998-2002 
Δln GVA 
Public ser-
vices1998-
2002 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
Δln Market potential 
(𝛿1) 
0.149*** 
(0.048) 
0.154*** 
(0.046) 
0.154** 
(0.066) 
0.138** 
(0.068) 
0.125** 
(0.054) 
-0.014 
(0.081) 
Industry shares YES YES YES YES YES - 
Degree share - YES YES YES YES - 
Agglomeration effects - - YES YES YES - 
Δln GDP all sectors 
1992-1997 
- - - YES YES - 
F-Stat (Cragg-Donald) - - - - 23.95 - 
Hansen J (p-value) - - - - 0.33 - 
r2 0.123 0.145 0.220 0.235 0.235 0.000 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. Δln Market potential (𝛿1) is 
based on Eq. (4-2) and the decay parameter (𝛿1) from Table 5, column (1). Industry shares are 
shares at total 1998 GVA in the following sectors: Construction, manufacturing, mining, financial ser-
vices, and other services. Degree share is the share for the workforce (at place of work) holding a 
university degree in 1998. Agglomeration effects include the 1998 market potential , population den-
sity, the 1997 log GDP as well as straight-line distances to Frankfurt and Cologne. Instrumental vari-
ables in column (5) are three indicator variations, each denoting one of the counties in which the in-
termediate stops Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg are located. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
So far we have estimated the agglomeration effects induced by the HSR line assuming that economic 
adjustments took place between 1998 to 2002. This choice is based on the results presented in the 
program evaluation section, where we find that each of the counties of the intermediate stops expe-
rienced a substantial impact over this period. To evaluate the temporal pattern of the adjustment and 
to empirically substantiate the chosen adjustment period, we estimate a time-varying treatment ef-
fects model such as in Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2015), where the treatment measure is the change in 
market potential used in Table 6. With this model, we estimate a series of market potential elastici-
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ties, each of which is identified from a comparison between long-differences in log GDP and log mar-
ket potential taken over a treatment year n and the base year 1998. We set up the model such that 
the identifying variation corresponds to our most conservative long-difference model in Table 6, col-
umn (5), i.e., we control for trends correlated with observables and restrict the identifying variation 
to the intermediate stops using instrumental variables. The exact details of the specification are in 
the notes to Figure 8, which presents the resulting estimated market potential elasticity series.   
Fig. 8 Market potential elasticity: Time-varying estimates  
 
Notes: The figure is based on the following panel specification: ln(𝑄𝑖𝑡) = ∑ [𝛿1,𝑛∆ ln(𝐷𝑖)×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]𝑛≠1998 +
𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where Qit is the output measured as GDP of county i in year t, n indexes treat-
ment years from 1992 to 2009, excluding the base year 1998, ∆ ln(𝐷𝑖) is the change in market poten-
tial assuming the decay parameter estimated in Table 5, column (1), Xit is a vector year effects inter-
acted with a vector of the following variables: industry shares at total 1998 GVA (construction, man-
ufacturing, mining, financial services, and other non-public services), the share of the workforce (at 
place of work) holding a university degree in 1998, the 1998 market potential, population density, 
the 1997 log GDP as well as straight-line distances to Frankfurt and Cologne. 𝑏𝑡  is a matrix of coeffi-
cients for each variable-year combination. 𝑐𝑖  and 𝑑𝑡  are county and year effects as in equation (4-1). 
We instrument the vector of change in market potential × year interaction terms ∆ ln(𝐷𝑖)×(𝑡 = 𝑛) us-
ing a full set of interaction terms between year effects and three indicator variations, each denoting 
one of the counties in which the intermediate stops Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg are located. 
Black dots represent point estimates of 𝛿1,𝑛 and the gray shaded area denotes the 95% confidence in-
tervals (standard errors clustered on the counties). Vertical dashed lines frame the period over 
which long-difference are taken in Table 5 and 6. The upper horizontal dashed lines indicates the 
market potential elasticity estimated in Table 6, column (5) model, which in terms of the identifying 
variation is comparable to the model presented.  
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As expected, we find no significant response in the spatial distribution of economic activity to the 
market potential shock for treatment years n<1998, while the estimates of the market potential elas-
ticity converge to the estimate in Table 6, column (5) relatively quickly for treatment years n>1998. 
By 2000, still in anticipation of the opening of the line in 2002, the spatial economy seems to have 
adjusted to the market potential shock as the time-varying estimates of the elasticity then remain 
relatively stable for a number of consecutive years. This pattern is suggestive of an impact of the HSR 
on the level, but not the trend of economic activity. In 2006, however, we observe a further relative 
shift in economic activity in regions which benefited from the HSR. Looking at the overall trend in the 
economic adjustment, this shift seems somewhat detached from the market potential shock, and it 
remains ultimately difficult to assert whether or not this shift is causally related to the HSR. 
We have conducted a number of further alterations of our baseline model, which we briefly discuss 
in the remainder of this subsection. A more detailed discussion can be found in the appendix.  
The exponential functional form of the spatial decay in spillovers, while popular in the theoretical 
and empirical literature (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Fujita & Ogawa, 1982; Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg, 
2002), is ad-hoc and other functional forms are theoretically imaginable. We have estimated an al-
ternative version of our benchmark model in which the market potential is captured as the total GDP 
within several mutually exclusive 20-minute travel time bins (e.g., 0–20 min, 20–40 min, etc.). For 
each travel time bin a separate market potential elasticity is estimated, thus allowing for a more flex-
ible pattern in the spatial decay. When comparing the predicted effects of the change in market po-
tential on GDP in this alternative model to our baseline model, we find an approximately linear rela-
tionship, suggesting that our results are not driven by an inappropriate functional form of the spatial 
decay (see appendix section 4-B). On a related note, we have addressed the insignificant sectoral 
market potential decay parameters by estimating the market potential elasticity imposing the decay 
parameter estimated across all sectors, which is highly significant. With the exception of “other non-
public services,” whose effect is already not significant in Table 5, the market potential estimates 
remain within close range of the results reported in Table 5 (see appendix section 4-B). 
We have experimented with alternative travel choice models underlying the construction of travel 
times. In one alternative choice model, we disallow switching from train to automobile or vice versa 
along a journey. In another alternative choice model, we disallow the use of the automobile altogeth-
er. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively within the range of the results pre-
sented here (see appendix section 4-C). 
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We have also experimented with alternative instrumental variables to restrict the identification to 
variation in the change in market potential to the fraction that arises from the intermediate transport 
stations. In particular, we consider the log straight-line distance to Montabaur as well as indictor 
variables for the counties of the intermediate stops as well as the adjacent counties as alternatives. 
The results remain close to those reported in Table 6 (see appendix section 4-D).  
Finally, we have also replicated the main stages of our analysis replacing the actual HSR with the 
considered but never built placebo HSR, which we introduced in the previous section. We find no 
robust evidence of HSR effects in this falsification exercise (see appendix section 4-E).  
D – Market potential effects on productivity 
As discussed in the introduction a large literature has analyzed agglomeration effects by regressing a 
measure of productivity against a measure of density. In order to connect to this literature and to 
assess to which extent the market potential (effective density) effect on GDP discussed above is at-
tributable to an increase in productivity of the labor force (rather than an expansion of the labor 
force), we replicate our baseline model using the ratio of GDP over the total employment (at work-
place) as a dependent variable. The empirical specification used shared similarities with the nominal 
wage equation estimated in the NEG literature (e.g. Hanson, 2005) . In Table 7 we present the results 
of three OLS (1–3) and three 2SLS (4–6) estimations. In each case, we present unconditional correla-
tions between per-worker GDP growth and change in log market potential, a version using the same 
controls as in Table 6, column (4), and one version where we additionally account for changes in the 
industry structure and the skill composition of the workforce. The instrumental variables used are 
the same as in Table 6, column (5).  
The preferred results in columns (2) and (5) suggest that the increase we find in GDP is driven by an 
increase in worker productivity, rather than an expansion of the workforce, as the estimated elastici-
ty is within the range of the models in Table 6. In comparing these results to the literature on the 
productivity effects of density it is important to acknowledge that unlike conventional density 
measures, our market potential takes into account the economic activity in surrounding regions, al-
beit with a lower weight. As a measure of effective density the market potential therefore introduces 
a spatial autocorrelation, which reduces variation in effective density across counties. It turns out 
that the standard deviation in the 1998 log market potential across counties in our data is almost 
three times the standard deviation in the 1998 log employment density. Our elasticity of productivity 
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with respect to effective density is, therefore, not directly comparable to the majority of estimates in 
the agglomeration economics literature as a 1% increase in market potential, on average, implies a 
much larger percentage increase in density. Normalized by the log ratio of the standard deviations of 
effective density (market potential) over density (employment per area) our results imply a 3.8% 
elasticity of productivity with respect to employment density, which is close to previous estimates 
derived from cross-sectional research designs (e.g. Ciccone, 2002; Ciccone & Hall, 1996). 
Once we control for changes in the industry sector and skill composition the productivity effect is 
substantially reduced and is no longer significantly different from zero (columns 3 and 6). One inter-
pretation is that the increase in per-worker output is driven by a relative expansion of, on average, 
more productive and skill-intensive sectors, which benefit particularly from HSR. This may suggest 
that the economic adjustments are primarily due to selection instead of agglomeration effects 
(Combes et al., 2012). Another interpretation is that our controls for sector and skill composition are 
endogenous and we may be over-controlling, a bad control problem as discussed by Angrist and 
Pischke (2009). 
Tab. 7 Productivity effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆Ln (GDP/Employment (workplace)) 1998-2002 
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δln Market potential (𝛿1) 0.066 
(0.059) 
0.132** 
(0.058) 
0.009 
(0.048) 
0.170*** 
(0.055) 
0.108* 
(0.062) 
0.042 
(0.059) 
Industry shares - YES YES - YES YES 
Degree share - YES YES - YES YES 
Agglomeration effects - YES YES - YES YES 
Δln GDP/Employment 
(workplace) 1992-1997 
- YES YES - YES YES 
Composition effects - - YES - - YES 
r2 0.007 0.148 0.495 - 0.147 0.487 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. Δln Market potential (𝛿1) is 
based on Eq. (4-2) and the decay parameter (𝛿1) from Table 5, column (1). Industry shares are 
shares at total 1998 GVA in the following sectors: Construction, manufacturing, mining, financial ser-
vices, and other services. Degree share is the share for the workforce (at place of work) holding a 
university degree in 1999. Agglomeration effects include the 1998 market potential, population den-
sity, the 1997 log GDP as well as straight-line distances to Frankfurt and Cologne. Composition ef-
fects are 1998 to 2002 changes in industry shares and 1999 to 2002 degree share. Instrumental var-
iables in columns (4–6) are three indicator variations, each denoting one of the counties in which the 
intermediate stops Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg are located. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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5 External validity 
Before we draw conclusions in the next section, some words are due on the external validity of our 
findings. As with most attempts to improve identification, our variant of the inconsequential units 
approach (Redding & Turner, 2015) provides local treatment effect estimates as we infer a causal 
effect from a large accessibility shock on small towns. If marginal agglomeration benefits were con-
cave in city size, HSR effects could be smaller for the typically connected large cities. It is not possible 
for us to test for such a concave relationship since our inconsequential units approach is not suited 
for large metropolitan areas that are connected purposely (implying a potential for reverse causali-
ty). That said, the fact that the implied elasticity of productivity with respect to a density of 3.8% 
(previous subsection) is close to the average of comparable estimates in the literate (Melo et al., 
2009) is at least suggestive that our results have some generalizability.  
As with every case study, some factors are specific to our context and are worth considering before 
transferring conclusions to other contexts. As mentioned in section 2-A, the Cologne-Frankfurt HSR 
was built parallel to a highway (A3) and the presence of such a substitute may affect the effects of the 
HSR as much as the technology of the HSR itself. If one is willing to accept that our estimated parame-
ters hold some external validity, our market potential approach can be used to compute counterfac-
tual outcomes as follows: 
∆ln (𝑄𝑖)̂ = δ̂1 [ln (∑ 𝑄𝑗,𝑡=1998𝑒
−?̂?2𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗
) − ln(∑ 𝑄𝑗,𝑡=1998𝑒
−?̂?2𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑗
)] 
(7-1) 
, where 𝛿1 is our preferred estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to effective density and 𝛿2 
is our preferred estimate of the spatial decay. All variables are defined as in equation (4-3). It is pos-
sible to compare predicted outcomes ∆ln (𝑄𝑖)̂  across different scenarios by solving equation (7-1) 
assuming different speeds on the rail and road network in the transport matrices 𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=(pre,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) be-
fore (pre) and after (post) the HSR opening. In Table 8, we first increase the speed on the HSR (1-4, 2 
is the actual scenario) before we eliminate the highway (5) and increase the speed of the highway 
(6). Without the highway (5), the effects on the three intermediate towns would have been even 
larger and roughly as large the effect of an HSR operating at a 40km/h (25%) higher average speed 
(assuming there are no complementarities between the HSR and the highway). In keeping with intui-
tion, increasing the speed on the highway by 20km/h (6) has roughly the same effects as reducing 
the speed of the HSR by about 20km/h. 
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Tab. 8 Counterfactual scenarios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HSR speed (km/h) 140 160 180 200 160 160 
Highway speed (km/h) 100 100 100 100 0 120 
Limburg GDP effect (%) 3.16 4.55 5.73 6.75 6.62 2.37 
Montabaur GDP effect (%) 4.85 6.40 7.65 8.71 9.14 4.02 
Siegburg GDP effect (%) 1.63 2.25 2.79 3.27 3.29 1.33 
Total GDP effect (€, bn.) 5.16 7.90 10.46 12.88 10.99 4.53 
Extra GDP effect in % of actual (2) -34.74 0 32.41 63.03 39.01 -42.67 
Notes: Table illustrates the relative and aggregate GDP effects of the HSR under different average speeds of 
the two modes (first two lines). Counterfactual outcomes are computed as ∆ln (𝑄𝑖)̂ = δ̂1∆𝐷𝑖̂ , where δ̂1 
is our preferred estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to effective density. In computing 
the transport matrixes used to compute ∆𝐷𝑖̂  we assume that individuals strictly choose the fastest 
route between any pairs of counties. They can switch between rail and car at any rail station.  
Another feature of the analyzed institutional context are complementary investments into infrastruc-
ture. Minor upgrades were made to the Siegburger Bahn (new overhead system, accessibility at se-
lected stations), a light rail connecting Bonn to Siegburg (one of the intermediate stops). Station ter-
minal buildings were newly constructed or expanded in Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg, includ-
ing some improvements to existing facilities, such as bus stops (Roggendorf & Schmidt, 1999). Much 
of the new or expanded business activity discussed in section 2-A is located in new business parks 
developed close to the new HSR stations. It is difficult to create a counterfactual describing the situa-
tion with the HSR, but without such complementary investments, because the anecdotal evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests that these measures would have had little impact without the HSR. We be-
lieve that the economic effects are best understood as originating from the combination of a substan-
tial accessibility benefit and complementary measures that facilitate firms taking advantage of it. Our 
results, therefore, generalize to other contexts to the extent that similar complementary policies usu-
ally accompany the rollout of HSR.  
A final word concerns the entrepreneur Ralph Dommermuth, who founded one of the world’s largest 
web hosting companies (1&1) in his birthplace Montabaur. He is also an important investor involved 
in the development of the business park close to the Montabaur HSR station. Like the other stake-
holders cited in section 2, he stresses the role of the HSR as a critical ingredient for economic devel-
opment, in particular the access to a wider labor market pool the HSR offers (Ferdinand, 2015). Yet, 
it seems possible that personal attachments to his birthplace partially motivated his strong engage-
ment as an investor, implying that without a similarly wealthy and engaged citizen the HSR effects in 
Montabaur could have been more moderate or, at least, delayed. 
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6 Conclusion 
We analyze the economic effects of the Cologne-Frankfurt HSR in Germany, which connects the two 
major economic core regions in Germany and a number of peripheral regions along the way. Due to 
the institutional setting the HSR represents one of the rare occasions where transport improvements 
provide plausibly exogenous variation in access to surrounding economic mass. We find that the av-
erage GDP in the counties of the intermediate stops six years after the opening of the line exceeds a 
counterfactual trend by 8.5%. We make further use of the quasi-experimental variation provided by 
the HSR to contribute to a literature that has focused on estimating the strength and scope spatial 
scope of agglomeration effects. We find an elasticity of output with respect to effective density, i.e., 
market potential, of about 12.5% in our most conservative model. Our results further imply an elas-
ticity of productivity with respect to density of 3.8%, which is well within the range of existing cross-
sectional estimates. The strength of spillovers halves every 30 minutes of travel time and is near to 
zero after about 200 minutes. The spillovers we detect are significantly less localized than in previ-
ous studies that have identified similar spillover effects from within-city variation, but more localized 
than those found in the empirical NEG literature with an emphasis on trade cost. The benefits HSR 
has delivered to the peripheral regions operate through knowledge diffusion and labor market pool-
ing and the effects of improved access to intermediated goods and consumer markets to the extent 
that the ease of communication reduces transaction costs, and thus, Marshallian externalities 
(Marshall, 1920). Our results complement recent evidence suggesting that improved transport link-
ages can benefit core regions at the expense of peripheral regions through a trade channel (Faber, 
2014). 
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1 Introduction 
This technical appendix complements the main paper by providing material not reported in the main 
paper for brevity. The appendix partially replicates fractions of the text in the main paper to improve 
readability. It is not designed to stand alone or to replace the reading of the main paper. 
2 Study area 
Our study area comprises the German federal states Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-
Palatinate, out of a total of 16 federal states. As is evident from Figure A1 these three states are 
located in the west of Germany. In 1996, six years before the opening of the HSR, the total population 
of the study area was about 28 million, thus somewhat less than the size of California and about the 
size of Belgium and the Netherlands together. The share of the total German population was about 
34%. The share of the German GDP was slightly higher at 36%.  
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Fig. A1. Study area 
 
Notes: Own illustration. 
Table A1 compares characteristics within 115 counties within the study area to the characteristics of 
287 counties in the other federal states. The average county in our study area in 1996 had a 
population of about 241k, which is significantly larger than the average county in the rest of the 
country (157k). In terms of output per worker, our study area is fairly similar to the rest of the 
country (€71.5k vs. €70.8). Also, the shares of various industries at the regional GVA are remarkably 
similar.  
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Tab. A1.  County characteristics: Study area vs. rest of Germany 
 Study area Rest of Germany 
1996 Mean S.E. Mean S.E 
Population  240,594 14,552 157,219 7,427 
GDP (1000 €) 5,787,372 549,684 3,533,259 267,128 
GDP/Worker (€) 71,456 740 70,751 546 
Share GVA: Construction 2.7% 0.1% 3.7% 0.1% 
Share GVA: Mining 13.6% 0.5% 13.2% 0.3% 
Share GVA: Other services 33.7% 0.5% 33.1% 0.3% 
Share GVA: Retail 9.0% 0.2% 8.8% 0.1% 
Share GVA: Manufacturing 16.3% 0.5% 16.9% 0.3% 
Share GVA: Financial services 12.9% 0.3% 12.0% 0.1% 
Share GVA: Public services 11.8% 0.3% 12.3% 0.2% 
Notes: Study area includes 115 counties (NUTS3 regions) in the federal states North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate. Rest of Germany includes 287 counties.  
3 Program evaluation 
This section complements the program evaluation section in the main paper by providing additional 
detail on the synthetic counties, further robustness checks, and greater details on the falsification 
exercises. 
A – Synthetic counties 
The synthetic control algorithm generates the synthetic counties summarized in Table 1 in the main 
paper as weighted combinations of non-treated counties (the donor pool). The table below shows the 
donors (included in the synthetic counties) and their corresponding weights for each of the synthetic 
counties. One relevant insight is that none of the synthetic counties depend solely on one donor. 
Another important insight is that none of the donor counties with sizable weights are located near to 
the synthetic county it contributes to. It is therefore unlikely that the counterfactual is contaminated 
by spillover effects from the HSR onto counties entering the synthetic controls. 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen –From periphery to core 4 
 
Tab. A2.  Synthetic counties: Weights table 
Limburg-Weilburg 
(Limburg) 
Westerwaldkreis 
(Montabaur) 
Rhein-Siegkreis 
(Siegburg) 
County Weight County Weight County Weight 
Ludwigshafen 0.468 Borken 0.245 Kusel 0.323 
Heinsberg 0.445 Altenkirchen  0.239 Rheingau-Taunus-Kr. 0.184 
Hochtaunuskreis 0.047 Suedwestpfalz 0.204 Main-Taunus-Kreis 0.154 
Odenwaldkreis 0.034 Bitburg-Prüm 0.129 Ahrweiler 0.108 
Herne 0.004 Trier-Saarburg 0.071 Südliche Weinstraße 0.094 
Kaiserslautern 0.002 Neuwied 0.022 Mainz-Bingen 0.052 
  
Birkenfeld 0.019 Herne 0.05 
  
Olpe 0.019 Kaiserslautern 0.031 
  
Rhein-Hunsrück-Kreis 0.004 Rhein-Lahn-Kreis 0.001 
  
Herne 0.003 
  
  
Vogelsbergkreis 0.002 
  
  
Ahrweiler, Alzey-
Worms, Bad Dürkheim, 
Bad Kreuznach, 
Cochem-Zell, Coesfeld, 
Darmstadt-Dieburg, 
Donnersbergkreis, 
Euskirchen, Fulda, 
Heinsberg, Hersfeld-
Rotenburg, Höxter, 
Kaiserslautern, Kleve, 
Lahn-Dill-Kreis, Landau 
in der Pfalz, Lippe, 
Main-Kinzig-Kreis, 
Mainz-Bingen, Mayen-
Koblenz, Neustadt an 
der Weinstraße, 
Paderborn, 
Recklinghausen, Rhein-
Lahn-Kreis, Rheingau-
Taunus-Kreis, 
Schwalm-Eder-Kreis, 
Soest, Steinfurt, 
Südliche Weinstraße, 
Unna, Viersen, 
Warendorf, Werra-
Meißner-Kreis, Wesel, 
Wetteraukreis 
all 
0.001 
  Notes:  Table shows the donor counties and their weights in the synthetic counties summarized in Table 1 in 
the main paper.  
B – Varying donor pools and predictor 
To provide a valid counterfactual a control group must not be affected by a treatment. In the present 
context, the main concern is that there might be a spatial spillover effect from the HSR onto counties 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen –From periphery to core 5 
 
in the donor pool, in which case the treatment effect could be downward biased. Table A2 suggests 
that the counties from which the synthetic controls are generated are generally not near to the 
treated counties. As a further robustness check, we replicate the synthetic control analysis using 
donor pools (from which the algorithm can draw) that exclude counties located adjacent to an 
intermediate stop county or adjacent to any HSR county. 
Another concern with the synthetic control method is that the counterfactual might be sensitive to 
the set of predictor variables, which the algorithm seeks to balance in constructing a synthetic 
control. Since the method balances not only the predictors but also trends (treated vs. synthetic 
control) prior to an analyzed intervention, using different sets of predictors should result in different 
weights matrices (different combinations of donor counties in a synthetic control county), but similar 
post-intervention trends as long as relative pre-trends (treated vs. other non-treated trends) are a 
good approximation for relative counterfactual trends. The latter assumption cannot be tested 
directly. However, it is informative to replicate a synthetic control analysis using a different set of 
predictor variables. If the assumption is plausible (pre-trends are a good approximation of 
counterfactual trends), the resulting treatment effect should not be too sensitive to the choice of 
predictors. 
In the table below we replicate the analyses combining different donor pools (non-treated counties 
from which the algorithm can draw) with different sets of predictors (balancing covariates). All 
combinations yield positive and statistically significant estimates that are reasonably close to the 
baseline estimate (column 1), but there is some variation. Excluding counties adjacent to the 
intermediate stops has virtually no effect on the estimated treatment effects (2). This is the expected 
result because none of the adjacent counties carry a high weight in any of the synthetic controls (see 
Table A2). Excluding counties from the donor pool that are adjacent to any HSR county has a larger 
effect (3). However, the estimated treatment effect is not larger, as would be expected if there was a 
spillover problem in the baseline, but is somewhat smaller than in the baseline.  
Using predictors that describe the economic activity within counties (GDP per capita, the ratio of out-
commuters over in-commuters, and population density) yields a larger treatment effect than using 
predictors describing the composition of industries and workers (seven industry shares and the 
share of the population holding an academic degree) (4-5). Combining these subsets of predictors 
with the most restricted donor pool (3), however, brings the treatment effects again closer to the 
baseline. 
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It is reassuring to see that alterations of the baseline model do not lead to mutually reinforcing 
departures from the baseline estimate (in contrast, the effects of different alterations cancel each 
other out). Our main takeaway is that the treatment estimate is unlikely driven by specification 
issues of the synthetic control method and, instead, is a genuine feature of the data as already 
suggested by the unweighted difference-in-differences analyses.  
Tab. A3.  Varying synthetic control predictors and donor pools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP 
T x (YEAR>2002) 0.049** 
(0.014) 
0.050** 
(0.013) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.075*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.013) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Synth predictors Economic 
activity & 
composition 
Economic 
activity & 
composition 
Economic 
activity & 
composition 
Economic 
activity 
Composition Economic 
activity 
Composition 
Synth donor pool All non-HSR 
station 
counties 
Non-HSR 
station 
counties 
excluding 
counties 
adjacent to 
intermediate 
HSR stops 
Non-HSR 
station 
counties 
excluding 
counties 
adjacent to 
any HSR 
stop 
All non-HSR 
station 
counties 
All non-HSR 
station 
counties 
Non-HSR 
station 
counties 
excluding 
counties 
adjacent to 
any HSR 
stop 
Non-HSR 
station 
counties 
excluding 
counties 
adjacent to 
any HSR 
stop 
r2 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Notes: Standard errors clustered on counties. Donor pool is the set of counties from which the synthetic 
control algorithm can draw. Predictors is the set of covariates that are balanced over the treated and 
the synthetic control. T is a 0/1 indicator variable indexing the treated counties. Economic activity is 
a vector of variables including GDP per capita, the ratio of out-commuters over in-commuters, and 
population density. Composition is a vector of variables including seven industry shares and the 
share of the population holding an academic degree. To ease comparison, Table 2, column ( 4) model 
is replicated in column (1). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
C – Treatment effect on other outcomes 
Table 4 in the main paper uses our most demanding program evaluation specification (Table 2, 
column 6 in the main paper) to estimate HSR treatment effects on various economic outcomes. In the 
table below, we replicate the analysis using the standard DD model from Table 2, column (1).  
The results confirm the significantly positive per-worker GDP effect from Table 4 in the main paper. 
However, the percentage effect, at 2.5%, is smaller than in the more demanding synthetic control 
specification controlling for pre-trends (5.6% after the opening, 7.2% after six years). Moreover, 
there is a significantly positive workplace employment effect of 2.9%, suggesting that the HSR effect 
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on GDP is partially driven by an expansion of the labor force and partially driven by an increase in 
productivity. The standard DD specification also reveals a relative increase in residence employment 
and population. The HSR effect on the number of commuters is positive and statistically significant. 
The econometric specification used in Table 4 in the main paper is our preferred specification due to 
the presumed strength of the counterfactual (synthetic control counties) and its control for pre-
trends. However, given the relatively small number of pre-treatment workplace employment and 
commuting observations, there is some risk of over-controlling. To reconcile the evidence, it is, 
therefore, informative to consult Figure 3 in the main paper, which plots the relative trends (treated 
– synthetic control) over the study period. From Figure 3 it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
positive population effect revealed by the simple DD specification (Table A4) is likely attributable to 
trend heterogeneity since there are positive relative trends over the entire study period (which 
flatten rather than increase after the completion of the HSR). In contrast, the relative pre-trends in 
in-commuting are relatively flat and there is a notable (positive) shift over the adjustment period for 
any of the considered intermediate stops. Thus, the simple DD results revealing a significantly 
positive effect on commuting (Table A4, column 5) seem credible. It is further reassuring that the 
more demanding specification (Table 4, column 5) yields a large and positive point estimate whose 
statistical insignificance is driven by large standard errors. The relative temporal trends in 
workplace employment are more ambiguous, which makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
origins of the GDP effect (increase in employment vs. productivity).  
Tab. A4.  Treatment effect on other economic outcomes: Standard DD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log 
GDP/Workpl
ace 
employment 
Log 
Workplace 
employment 
Log 
Residence 
employment 
Log 
population 
Log No of 
in-
commuters 
Log No of 
out-
commuters 
T x 
(YEAR>2002) 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.059*** 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
County Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2 0.932 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.996 0.997 
N 1,921 1,921 1,921 2,260 1,808 1,808 
Notes: Table replicates Table 4 from the main paper using the standard DD model from Table 2, column (1) 
in the main paper. Number of observations vary due to different lengths of the time-series. Standard 
errors clustered on counties. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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D – Breakdown by industries 
The table below replicates the synthetic control baseline model (Table 2, column 4) using gross value 
added (GVA) by sectors as a dependent variable. For each model, we create synthetic counties using 
the same method as in the baseline model (using GDP). We find that the positive output effect that 
comes with the HSR is driven by financial services and other non-public services. This result 
confirms anecdotal evidence citing the positive effects on firms specializing in consulting (Emc2), 
telecommunications (1&1), software (Itac) or events (ADG). The result is also in line with theoretical 
expectations because the HSR reduces the cost of moving people, but not the cost of shipping goods. 
Tab. A5.  Treatment effect by industry sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log GDP Ln GVA Ln GVA Ln GVA Ln GVA Ln GVA Ln GVA Ln GVA 
Sector All All Constru
ction 
Mining Manufac
turing 
Financia
l 
services 
Other 
non-
public 
services 
Public 
services 
T x 
(YEAR>2002) 
0.036** 
(0.013) 
0.031* 
(0.014) 
-0.027 
(0.052) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
0.067* 
(0.027) 
0.025* 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
County effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2 0.999 0.999 0.995 0.996 0.997 0.998 1.000 1.000 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on counties. T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the 
treated counties. Observation period is 1996 to 2005 in all models due to data limitations (changing 
sector classifications). To ease comparison, Table 2, column (4) model is replicated in column (1). * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
E – Commuting patterns 
The anecdotal evidence reviewed in section 2-A in the main paper suggests that firms benefited from 
the HSR due to an improved access to labor markets. In this section, we use a confidential data set 
from the Institute for Employment Research to analyze how the improved accessibility provided by 
an HSR impacts on commuting flows between residence and workplace locations.1 The data set 
contains the number of in-commuters and out-commuters commuting into and from the 
intermediate HSR stop municipalities (Limburg, Montabaur, Siegburg) along with the respective 
destinations and origins. The starting point of our analysis is a gravity model of commuting: 
                                                             
1  We gratefully acknowledge Per Kropp from the Institute for Employment Research for facilitating the access 
to these data. 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen –From periphery to core 9 
 
ln 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ℶ𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + (𝜐𝑖×𝜒𝑗) + 𝜚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 
, where 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of commuters commuting from location i to location j at period t, 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the 
travel time between i and j at period t, (𝜐𝑖×𝜒𝑡) is an origin-destination-specific effect, 𝜚𝑡is a period 
effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random error term. We estimate this model in first differences: 
∆ ln𝐶𝑖𝑗 = ℵ + ℶ∆𝐸𝑖𝑗 + ∆𝜖𝑖𝑗 
, where ∆ ln𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the ln change in the number of commuters from the before-HSR to the after-HSR 
period. We use the average number of commuters from 1992 to 1995 for the before-HSR period and 
the average number of commuters from 2010 to 2012 for the after-HSR period (the HSR opened in 
2002). ∆𝐸𝑖𝑗  is the change in bilateral travel times due to the HSR as in equation 4-3 in the main paper.  
We note that this empirical model provides a strong control for unobserved heterogeneity. Recent 
cross-sectional applications of commuting gravity models (Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, & Wolf, 2015; 
Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2016) control for push and pull factors via origin and destination fixed effects 
(𝜐𝑖 + 𝜒𝑗). Because our analysis focuses on the effects of a change in infrastructure, we can control for 
interactions of origin and destination fixed effects (𝜐𝑖×𝜒𝑗).  
The results are in Table A6. Because the commuting matrix is not symmetric (three HSR stops vs. all 
locations in the study area) it is useful to use the number of in-commuters and out-commuters as 
dependent variables to test the internal validity. We also consider the two predominant functional 
forms of the spatial decay in commuting probabilities, namely the semi-log and the log-log form. We 
find that a one-minute reduction in travel time induced by the HSR increases the number of 
commuters on an origin-destination route by 5%. The respective elasticity is 3.7. These estimates are 
roughly within the range of existing commuting gravity estimates, although the estimated semi-
elasticity is somewhat smaller and the estimated elasticity is somewhat larger compared to recent 
estimates for Germany (Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2016). In the context of this study it is notable that our 
estimated decay parameter in the market potential (see Table 5 in the main paper) is closer to the 
commuting decay parameter reported in Table A6 than to recent estimates of decay parameters 
capturing the spillover effects between firms (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015) or decay parameters in NEG 
models capturing trade costs (Hanson, 2005).  
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Tab. A6.  Commuting effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆Ln # in-
commuter 
∆Ln # in-
commuter 
∆Ln # out-
commuter 
∆Ln # out-
commuter 
∆ Travel time (minutes) -0.048*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
-0.048*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
∆ Ln travel time  
 
-3.793*** 
(0.934) 
 
 
-3.662*** 
(0.884) 
Observations 206 206 206 206 
R2 0.065 0.080 0.074 0.086 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In-commuter models use flows from all municipalities in the 
study area into intermediate HSR municipalities (Limburg, Montabaur, Siegburg). Out-commuter 
models use flows from intermediate HSR municipalities to all municipalities in the study area. First 
difference in # of commuters is the difference between the average number of commuters from 
1992–1995 and the average number of commuters from 2010–2012. First difference in travel time is 
based on the same transport cost matrices as used in the baseline models. Observations weighted by 
the average number of commuters (across all period). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In Figure A2 and Table A7 we differentiate the HSR effects by HSR municipality. In line with the 
general trend in Table A6, the number of in-commuters from areas that are now in closer to reach 
due to HSR increased in Limburg and Montabaur. This is in line with the anecdotal evidence pointing 
to firms benefiting from access to wider labor markets. We do not find a similar effect for Siegburg. 
This does not necessarily imply that the HSR had no impact at all on commuting. Possibly, the HSR is 
used by few highly-skilled workers commuting from farther distances, which are critical for firm 
competitiveness and productivity, but hard to detect empirically. Still, it appears that the role of 
improved labor market access is less obvious for Siegburg than for the other towns, making it more 
likely that the improved attractiveness to firms materialized through other channels. Consistently 
across all three cities, we find that the HSR promotes out-commuting to areas that are now within 
closer reach. We conclude that HSR had a significant impact on commuting patterns in the study area 
and that, at least in Montabaur and Limburg, firms have been drawing employees from a wider labor 
market since the opening of the HSR.  
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Fig. A2. HSR effects on commuting from and to HSR municipalities 
 
Notes: In-commuter models use flows from all municipalities in the study area into intermediate HSR 
municipalities. Out-commuter models use flows from intermediate HSR municipalities to all 
municipalities in the study area. First difference in # of commuters is the difference between the 
average number of commuters from 1992–1995 and the average number of commuters from 2010–
2012. First difference in travel time is based on the transport cost matrices summarized in Figure 4 
in the main paper. Observations weighted by the average number of commuters (across all period). 
Tab. A7.  Commuting effects by HSR city 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆Ln # in-
commuter 
∆Ln # in-
commuter 
∆Ln # in-
commuter 
∆Ln # out-
commuter 
∆Ln # out-
commuter 
∆Ln # out-
commuter 
∆Travel time (min) -0.076*** 
(0.015) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.069*** 
(0.012) 
-0.055*** 
(0.019) 
City Limburg Montabaur Siegburg Limburg Montabaur Siegburg 
N 81 55 70 81 55 70 
r2 0.153 0.152 0.001 0.012 0.186 0.112 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference in # of commuters is the difference between 
the average number of commuters from 1992–1995 and the average number of commuters from 
2010–2012. First difference in travel time is based on the same transport cost matrices as used in the 
baseline models. Observations weighted by the average number of commuters. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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F – Falsification I 
Our first falsification exercise is a classic “placebo” study. We use exactly the same empirical design 
as in the baseline estimations to estimate the economic impact of an alternative HSR route that was 
considered during the planning stages but never built. The track would have had three intermediate 
stops in each of the involved federal states and would have passed through the economically and 
politically relevant cities of Bonn (the former federal capital located in North Rhine-Westphalia), 
Koblenz (the largest city in northern Rhineland-Palatinate) and Wiesbaden (the state capital of 
Hesse). The exact location of these intermediate stops is evident from Figure A3 below. A detailed 
discussion of alternative routes can be found in Kandler (2002). 
Fig. A3. Placebo HSR 
 
Notes: Own illustration. The route of the placebo HSR is based on Kandler (2002). 
Table A8 summarizes the pre-treatment characteristics of the counties of the placebo intermediate 
HSR stops, synthetic control counties constructed for comparison to the placebo-treated counties 
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using the same procedure as in the main paper, and all other non-treated counties in the study area. 
The placebo-treated counties are economically significantly more potent than the treated counties 
(in the main paper), which supports our notion that the HSR treatment at the intermediate stops was 
exogenous to their economic strength. Perhaps with the exception of Wiesbaden, the synthetic 
counties look very similar to their placebo counterparts.  
Tab. A8.  Pre-treatment characteristics: Treated vs. synthetic controls 
 
Bonn Koblenz Wiesbaden 
All non-
treated  
counties 
Predictor variable Treat Synth Treat Synth  Treat Synth  Mean S.D. 
GDP/worker (€) 80.3 79.4 74.1 76.7 78.3 70.0 69.0 7.9 
Ratio out/in-commuting 1.92 2.06 4.32 2.83 3.21 1.05 1.03 0.93 
Population / sqm land area 1.31 1.10 1.02 1.84 2.09 0.50 0.75 0.81 
Industry share: Const. 1.8% 1.8% 1.6% 1.6% 1.1% 2.7% 2.8% 1.1% 
Industry share: Mining 7.2% 7.2% 7.4% 7.4% 4.2% 5.1% 13.9% 5.0% 
Industry share: Services 41.1% 41.0% 41.0% 41.0% 44.7% 42.3% 33.3% 4.7% 
Industry share: Retail 7.4% 9.7% 10.7% 10.8% 8.1% 13.0% 8.8% 2.1% 
Industry share: Manufact. 8.9% 8.9% 9.0% 9.0% 5.3% 7.7% 16.7% 4.7% 
Industry share: Finance 20.5% 20.4% 12.1% 15.7% 14.0% 14.7% 12.7% 2.8% 
Share higher education  11.8% 11.8% 7.4% 11.6% 15.4% 5.8% 6.6% 3.1% 
Notes: The reported values are means across all years prior to 1998 (when construction began) except for 
the share of workers (at workplace) holding a university degree, which refers to 1999, the earliest 
year for which data was available. 
Figure A4 corresponds to Figure 2 in the main paper. The left panel of Figure A4 compares the GDP 
trend of Koblenz to its synthetic counterpart. Koblenz as a potential stop on the placebo HSR line 
roughly corresponds to Montabaur in that it is located in Rhineland-Palatinate and is a comparable 
distance from Cologne and Frankfurt. Notably, Koblenz is located about 25km to the west of 
Montabaur, so that positive – or negative – spillovers from the Montabaur station could exist, in 
principle. The two trended lines follow a relatively similar long-run trend. There is no or at least no 
persistent divergence in the trends after the placebo HSR opened. Similarly, there is no evident break 
in the relative trends in the number of in-commuters (right panel). 
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Fig. A4. Koblenz vs. synthetic control county 
Ln GDP 
 
Ln No if in-commuters 
 
Notes: Solid (dashed) line shows the trend line for Koblenz (the synthetic control county). Vertical lines 
indicate the period of substantial construction activity. Years up to 1997 were used in the 
construction of the weights matrix underlying the synthetic county.  
Figure A5 summarizes the comparisons between the placebo counties and the synthetic counterparts 
for different outcome variables (corresponding to Figure 3 in the main paper). There is, in general, 
little support for positive impacts on economic outcomes for either of the three placebo counties. The 
exception is perhaps the GDP and GDP/workplace trend in Bonn. It needs to be noted, though, that 
the Bonn mainline station is located within only 12km of Siegburg. There is even a light rail line 
connecting the main line station in Bonn to the Siegburg HSR station (it takes about 25min). Hence, 
there could be spillovers from Siegburg to Bonn. 
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Fig. A5. Relative trends for placebo-treated counties vs. synthetic control counties 
  
  
  
Notes: Solid lines represent the differences between the trend lines for a placebo-treated county and the 
synthetic control county. Vertical lines indicate the period of substantial construction activity. Years 
up to 1997 were used in the construction of the weights matrices underlying the synthetic counties. 
Dashed lines are extrapolated linear fits using observations before 1998. 
Tables A9–A11 replicate Tables 2–4 in the main paper for the three placebo HSR stations. The mean 
treatment effect on GDP across the three cities is near to and not statistically different from zero in 
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen –From periphery to core 16 
 
all specifications. The separate treatment estimates by treated county produce significant estimates 
with mixed signs in the naïve DD specification, but no significant cumulative effects using synthetic 
counties as comparisons (although Wiesbaden is close to borderline significance after six years). We 
do not find any significant effect for the other outcome measures either, although there are large and 
positive point estimates for GDP/Workplace (but even larger standard errors).  
Tab. A9.  Treatment effect on GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log GDP 
Control group Non-treated counties Synthetic counties 
T x (YEAR>2002) 
[𝜃] 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
-0.036 
(0.039) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
0.025 
(0.048) 
0.022 
(0.073) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
T x (YEAR>2002) x 
(YEAR-2003) [𝜗P] 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.012) 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
Cumulated effect   0.007   0.015 
after 3 years   (0.030)   (0.036) 
Cumulated effect   0.022   0.012 
after 6 years   (0.065)   (0.081) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constr. years x T  NO YES YES NO YES YES 
T x (YEAR-2003) NO NO YES NO NO YES 
r2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
N 1980 1980 1980 108 108 108 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on counties. T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the 
placebo-treated counties. Cumulated effects computed as exp (?̂? + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. Cumulated 
standard errors computed as exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?) + (𝑡 − 2003)2×var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. 
Constr, years x T indicates treatment T x year n interaction terms ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998 . * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab. A10.  Treatment effects on GDP by treated county 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log GDP 
 Bonn Koblenz Wiesbaden 
Control group Non-treat. Synthetic Non-treat. Synthetic Non-treat. Synthetic 
TREAT x (YEAR>2002) 
[𝜃] 
0.041*** 
(0.006) 
0.039 
(0.030) 
-0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.017 
(0.073) 
-0.043*** 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.068) 
TREAT x (YEAR>2002) 
x (YEAR-2003) [𝜗P] 
 
 
-0.013** 
(0.004) 
 
 
-0.022* 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
Cumulated effect  0.002  -0.049  0.097 
after 3 years  (0.041)  (0.092)  (0.091) 
Cumulated effect  -0.035  -0.110  0.207 
after 6 years  (0.052)  (0.116)  (0.115) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constr. years x T  NO YES NO YES NO YES 
T x (YEAR-2003) NO YES NO YES NO YES 
r2 0.997 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.997 1.000 
N 1998 36 1998 36 1998 36 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust in (2), (4) and (6) and clustered on counties in (1), (3), 
and (5). T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the placebo-treated counties. Cumulated effects 
computed as exp (?̂? + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. Cumulated standard errors computed as exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?) +
(𝑡 − 2003)2×var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. Constr, years x T indicates treatment T x year 
n interaction terms ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998 . * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Tab. A11.  Treatment effect on other economic outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log 
GDP/work
er 
Log 
Workplace 
employme
nt 
Log 
Residence 
employme
nt 
Log 
population 
Log No of 
in-
commuters 
Log No of 
out-
commuters 
Control group Synthetic counties 
T x (YEAR>2002) 
[𝜃] 
0.126 
(0.068) 
-0.083 
(0.070) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.037 
(0.142) 
0.068 
(0.049) 
T x (YEAR>2002) x 
(YEAR-2003) [𝜗P] 
0.012 
(0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Cumulated effect 0.176 -0.103 -0.011 0.012 -0.050 0.056 
after 3 years (0.139) (0.096) (0.045) (0.022) (0.213) (0.065) 
Cumulated effect 0.218 -0.126 -0.014 0.013 -0.064 0.041 
after 6 years (0.215) (0.120) (0.060) (0.031) (0.279) (0.082) 
County Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constr. years x T  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x (YEAR-2003) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
r2 0.921 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 
N 102 102 102 120 96 96 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on counties. T is a 0,1 indicator variable indexing the 
treated counties. Cumulated effects computed as exp (?̂? + ?̂?P×(𝑡 − 2003)) − 1. Cumulated standard 
errors computed as exp(𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜃) + (𝑡 − 2003)2×var(?̂?P) + 2×(𝑡 − 2003)×cov(?̂?, ?̂?P)) − 1. Constr, 
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years x T indicates treatment T x year n interaction terms ∑ 𝜃𝑛[𝑇𝑖×(𝑡 = 𝑛)]
2002
𝑛=1998 . * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
G – Falsification II 
As a more general placebo test, Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) propose replicating the 
synthetic control analysis using subjects in the donor pool (potential controls) as treated subjects. 
The idea of the test is to evaluate the likelihood of obtaining a spurious result with the implemented 
method. In the left panel of Figure A6 we illustrate the result of a replication of the synthetic control 
analysis, assigning each of the non-treated counties (no HSR stop) as a treated county. We illustrate 
the ln GDP gap, which is the difference between the ln GDP of the (placebo) treated county and the 
corresponding synthetic control county in a given year, normalized by the 1998 difference. As 
expected, the trends in ln GDP gaps of the placebo counties (gray lines) appear to be random in the 
sense that they are centred on the zero line with some notable variation. Unlike for the placebo stops, 
the ln GDP gaps for the actual stops show a systematic pattern as the treatment effect is positive and 
roughly within the same range in each case.  
We can now ask the question of how likely it is that a random combination of placebo stops will yield 
an average treatment effect that is at least as large as the one found for the three actually treated 
counties. To answer the question, we randomly draw 1,000 combinations of placebo-treated 
counties. For each combination, we compute the average placebo treatment effect as the difference in 
the mean ln GDP gap over the period 2003–2009 and 1992–1998 (to exclude the adjustment period). 
The distribution of the resulting placebo treatment effects is depicted in the right panel of the figure 
below. The analogically calculated treatment effect for the actual stops (vertical line) is in the right 
tail of the distribution of placebo treatment effects, outside the 90% confidence interval. We can thus 
conclude that it is unlikely that a random combination of counties in our study area will yield a 
similarly large treatment effect as we find for the actually treated counties. 
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Fig. A6. GDP gaps for actual stops vs. placebo stops 
 
Notes: Ln GDP gaps in left panel are defined as the differences between ln GDP values of any county and 
their synthetic control county normalized by the 1998 value. Placebo stops are counties without an 
HSR stop (in the donor pool of the synthetic control counties of the actual stops). Treatment effects 
in the right panel are defined as the difference in mean ln GDP gaps across the periods 1992 –1998 
and 2003–2009 (which excludes the adjustment period). The black line gives the distribution of 
placebo treatment effects for 1000 random combinations of three placebo stops (in each case the 
mean across the three individual treatment effects). The vertical line indicates the same for the th ree 
actual stops (the counties of Limburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg).  
H – Falsification III 
It can be argued that the test in the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010) conducted in the previous subsection 
is favorable to the actually treated counties because these are not randomly located in space. Instead, 
the treated counties are within a relatively close distance (compared to the average distance 
between counties in the study area), located approximately along a straight line. It is therefore more 
likely that unobserved spatially correlated characteristics have a similar impact on economic trends 
for the actually treated counties than for the randomly selected placebo-treated counties. To address 
this concern, we refine the selection process of placebo-treated counties to make the test more 
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demanding. To make the treatment estimates directly comparable to the baseline, we replicate the 
baseline identification strategy.  
As before, we run a series of 1,000 placebo tests, in each case drawing three counties (potential 
control counties) as placebo-treated counties. The difference compared to the previous test is that in 
each draw we generate a placebo HSR to which the placebo-treated counties have to be connected. In 
each iteration of the placebo test, we first randomly select one county as one endpoint of an artificial 
line (the artificial Cologne). Second, we randomly select another endpoint (the artificial Frankfurt) 
from all counties within a 140–180km range (in terms of straight-line distances) of the first endpoint 
(the distance between Cologne and Frankfurt is 160km). Third, we pick the three counties whose 
economic center (the largest city) is closest to a straight line connecting the two endpoints and 
define them as the treated counties (the artificial intermediate stops). Fourth, we create synthetic 
comparison counties for each of the placebo-treated counties according to our standard procedure. 
Fifth, we estimate the naïve DD model (Table 2, column 3 model, which uses all non-treated control 
counties and does not control for trends) as well as our preferred model (Table 2, column 6 model, 
which uses synthetic control counties and controls for trends) and save the point estimates and 
significance levels. 
Figure A7 and Table A12 summarize the resulting treatment effects after six years. Of the 1,000 test 
8.4% (24%) deliver significant treatment estimates using our preferred (naïve) DD model. 5.6% 
(8.2%) iterations resulted in treatment effects that were significant (at the 10% level) and at least as 
large as our benchmark estimates. The means of the point estimates is very close to zero. Notably, 
the standard deviation with 8.6% (5.4%) is relatively large compared to our 8.4% (5.7%) treatment 
estimate. 
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Fig. A7. Distribution of placebo treatment estimates on GDP 
 
Notes: The black (red) solid line plots the distribution of the placebo treatment estimates after six years 
according to our preferred (naïve in Table 2, column 3) DD specification in Table 2, column 6). The 
vertical black (red) dashed line indicates the benchmark point estimate. 
Tab. A12.  Distribution of artificial treatment effects on GDP  
Control 
Group 
All non-treated counties Synthetic counties 
Coeff. p-value p-value<0.1 Coeff. p-value p-value<0.1 
Obs 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Mean 0.000 0.371 0.240 -0.007 0.501 0.084 
Std. Dev. 0.047 0.306 0.428 0.096 0.277 0.278 
Min -0.117 0.000 0.000 -0.262 0.001 0.000 
Max 0.150 0.996 1.000 0.512 0.999 1.000 
Notes:  Artificial treatment estimates after six years based on Table 2, column (3) and (6) specifications. 
4 Agglomeration effects 
This section complements Section 4 of the main paper by providing additional results not reported in 
the main paper for brevity. 
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A – Grid search over parameter space 
As in any market potential equation, the elasticity and decay parameters are not necessarily 
separably identified. In fact, it is only the (ad-hoc) functional form of the spatial decay imposed in the 
market potential formulation (equation 4-2 in the main paper) that allows us to separately estimate 
the market potential elasticity (𝛿1) and the decay parameter (𝛿2). In general terms, a larger decay 
parameter 𝛿2 implies that more distant regions enter the market potential with a lower weight, 
reducing the degree of implicit spatial smoothing. The resulting larger variation in the market 
potential normally implies a lower estimate of the elasticity parameter 𝛿1.  
As there could be multiple combinations of these critical parameters that fit the data, we run a grid-
search over 500 possible values of 𝛿1 and 𝛿2(0.001 to 0.5) resulting in 250,000 parameter 
combinations for each of the models reported in Table 5 in the main paper. Our objective is to find 
the combination of parameters that minimizes the root mean squared error (RMSE) defined as: 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
1
𝑁
∑ (∆ln(𝑄𝑖)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ln(𝑄𝑖)̂
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
2𝑁
𝑖
 
, where ∆ln(𝑄𝑖) = (𝑄𝑖,𝑡=2002) − ln(𝑄𝑖,𝑡=1998) is observed in the data, upper bars indicate that a 
variable is normalized to have a zero mean, and ln(𝑄𝑖)̂  is computed as 
ln(𝑄𝑖)̂ = δ1
[
 
 
 
 ln (∑ 𝑄𝑗,𝑡=1998𝑒
−𝛿2𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=2002
𝑗
)
− ln (∑ 𝑄𝑗,𝑡=1998𝑒
−𝛿2𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡=1998
𝑗
)
]
 
 
 
 
 
The RMSE for all combinations of 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 by industry are illustrated in Figure 7 in the main paper. 
There are clearly defined global minima (white circles). This robustness check using an alternative 
approach to identify the elasticity and decay parameters increases our confidence in the point 
estimates of the decay parameters estimated with large standard errors reported in Table 5.  
B – Alternative spatial decay in market potential  
The exponential functional form of the spatial decay in spillovers, while popular in the theoretical 
and empirical literature (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Fujita & Ogawa, 1982; Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg, 
2002), is ad-hoc and other functional forms are theoretically imaginable. To evaluate the sensitivity 
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of the results to the chosen functional form of the spatial decay in the market potential we estimate 
an alternative to specification (4-3). 
ln(𝑄𝑖,𝑡=2002) − ln(𝑄𝑖,𝑡=1998) = 𝛿0 + ∑ δ1,m(𝐵𝑚,𝑖,2002 − 𝐵𝑚,𝑖,1998)
𝑚
+ ∆𝜀𝑖 
, where 𝐵𝑚,𝑖,t indicates the total GDP in all counties within a certain effective distance ring m in year 
t={1998,2002}. We group counties with mutually exclusive 20-minute travel time bins (e.g., 0–20min, 
20–40min, …, 140–160min). For each travel time bin a separate market potential elasticity δ1,m is 
estimated, thus allowing for a more flexible pattern in the spatial decay. In Figure A8 we compare the 
predicted effects of the change in market potential on GDP in this alternative model to our baseline 
model. We find an approximately linear relationship, suggesting that our results are not driven by an 
inappropriate functional form of the spatial decay.  
Fig. A8. Parametric vs. semi-parametric fitted values 
 
Notes:  Dashed line is the lowess fitted line (bandwidth of 0.8). Solid line is the 45 degree line.  
Another concern related to the spatial decay in the spillover effects is that for several sector-specific 
models in Table 5 the decay parameter is not statistically distinguishable from zero. It is important to 
note that an insignificant decay parameter estimate does not necessarily invalidate a significant 
market potential elasticity estimate. An insignificant decay parameter estimate implies that we 
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cannot reject that spillovers decline in space. However, the alternative hypothesis is not that there 
are no spillover effects, but, instead, that spillover effects have an infinite range. Smaller decay 
parameters reduce the spatial variation in the market potential and, hence, the market potential 
elasticity. If anything, a smaller decay parameter along with positive and statistically significant 
market potential elasticities implies strong spillovers. Large, standard errors, however, imply larger 
uncertainty surrounding the true spatial decay. Since the market potential elasticity and the decay 
parameter are not independent, as discussed in section 4-D in the main paper, it is useful to evaluate 
how the market potential elasticity interacts with the decay parameter. For this purpose, we 
replicate the sectoral GVA models from Table 5 in the main paper imposing the decay parameter 
estimated from the GDP across all sectors (Table 5, column (1)), which is estimated relatively 
precisely. This is a substantial variation in the decay parameter as the imposed decay parameter is 
about two-thirds of the estimated decay parameter for mining and manufacturing and about twice as 
large as the estimated decay parameter of financial services and other services. 
The table below reports the results. Except for other services, whose market potential elasticity is 
already not significant in Table 5, the estimates are within close range of the results in Table 5. This 
insensitivity of the market potential elasticity to variations in the decay parameter is reassuring 
because it suggests that a bias of the market potential elasticity estimate resulting from imperfect 
approximations of the decay parameter will likely be limited.  
Tab. A13.  Agglomeration effects by sectors: Fixed decay parameter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLn GVA 
1998-2002 
ΔLn GVA 
1998-2002 
ΔLn GVA 
1998-2002 
ΔLn GVA 
1998-2002 
ΔLn GVA 
1998-2002 
Sector Construction Mining Manufacturi
ng 
Financial 
Services 
Other 
Services 
Δln Market potential 
(𝛿1) 
0.354** 
(0.165) 
0.353** 
(0.162) 
0.362** 
(0.145) 
0.300*** 
(0.087) 
0.092 
(0.059) 
r2 0.035 0.025 0.033 0.046 0.016 
N 115 115 115 115 115 
Notes:  Market potential is constructed using the decay parameter from column (1) in Table 5 in the 
appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
C – Alternative travel time matrices 
To approximate the effective change in accessibility induced by HSR in our study area we have made 
a number of assumptions regarding the effective travel costs on different parts of the transport 
network and the way travelers are able to combine these segments. In this section, we experiment 
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with different travel choice decision rules to evaluate the degree to which our results depend on the 
assumptions made. In our benchmark model, which for the purpose of comparison we replicate in 
Table A14, column (1), we allow for a great degree of choice in finding the optimal route through the 
combined road and rail network. Travelers are allowed to switch mode at HSR stations, i.e., they can 
use their cars to travel to an HSR station, then switch to the HSR train, and then switch back to the 
road networks (e.g., using a taxi or a rental car).  
In column (2) we replicate the model with a more restrictive transport decision model. Travelers are 
assumed to choose the least-cost mode for a given origin-destination combination in any given 
period, but they are not allowed to switch mode during a journey. An HSR trip can only be combined 
with a conventional rail trip, but not the road network. As road trips are typically faster than 
conventional rail trips (because of higher speeds on highways), forcing HSR passengers onto the 
conventional rail network for the remaining parts of their journey results in a lower impact of HSR 
on travel times within our study area. Based on this more restrictive transport choice and the 
parameter estimates in column (2) the implied maximum impact on market potential (for 
Westerwaldkreis, the home county of the Montabaur stop) is 0.27 log points, which is less than the 
0.34 effect in model (1). Not surprisingly, given the smaller variation in change in market potential 
we find a larger market potential elasticity than in the baseline model. For Montabaur, the estimated 
market potential elasticity and the change in market potential implies a predicted effect on GDP of 
6%, which is virtually identical to the benchmark model. 
In column (3) we ignore the road network altogether and force travelers on the rail network for all 
trips in any period. As this change slows travelers down on virtually all trips that do not benefit from 
HSR, the impact of HSR on travel times becomes significantly larger. The increase in market potential 
for Montabaur amounts to 0.65 log points, which is almost twice as much as in the baseline model. 
While the market potential elasticity is lower than in the baseline model as expected, the estimated 
parameters in column (3) along with the changes in bilateral travel cost imply a predicted GDP 
impact of 8%, which is only slightly higher than in the baseline model. In column (4) we extend 
model (3) by a market potential measure that only incorporates the road network (we restrict the 
decay parameter to be the same as in the change in rail market potential) to disentangle the 
accessibility benefits induced by HSR from trends correlated with road accessibility. The results 
remain almost unchanged.  
Ahlfeldt / Feddersen –From periphery to core 26 
 
Finally, we use a mix of the transport matrices used in (2) and (3) in model (5). Making the heroic 
assumption that 50% of travelers use either the road or the rail network in any period and on every 
route we compute the average of the road and rail travel times. While the maximum accessibility 
effect of 0.32 log points is almost identical to the benchmark estimate the market potential elasticity 
is notably larger, implying a larger (maximum) predicted effect on GDP. 
A notable finding that emerges from the comparison of the estimates presented in Table A14 is that 
the decay parameter is reassuringly stable. The comparison across these models further reassures 
our decision to use model (1) as a benchmark model because it not only allows for relative flexible 
transport choices, but the model also delivers a combination of relatively high explanatory power 
and a conservative estimate of the market potential elasticity. 
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Tab. A14.  Agglomeration effects by transport cost matrix 
Notes: Estimation method is nonlinear least squares in all models. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) 
of the market potential coefficient 𝛿1 are heteroscedasticity robust and computed in separate OLS 
regressions holding the decay parameters (𝛿2) constant at the levels estimated in the NLS models 
reported in the table. The market potential of region i is the transport cost weighted sum of output in 
all regions j. The change in market potential is driven by changes in travel cost between regions 
exclusively. Regional output is held constant at 1998 level.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
D – Alternative 2SLS models 
At the heart of our identification strategy we argue that the timing of the construction and opening of 
the HSR is exogenous to the economic trends during the analyzed adjustment period as planning had 
been initiated several decades prior to then. We also argue that the timing and the routing is 
plausibly exogenous for the intermediate stops as the purpose of the line was to connect the 
endpoints and the intermediate stops resulted from political bargaining rather than economic 
reasoning. As such, the arguably most credible identification stems from counties that lie in-between 
Cologne and Frankfurt and benefit from improved access through the intermediate stops at Limburg, 
Montabaur, and Siegburg.  
In Table A15 we therefore restrict the information used to identify the market potential effect to this 
most plausibly exogenous fraction using a 2SLS estimation strategy. We consider three different sets 
of instrumental variables: the log of the straight-line distance to Montabaur station, which is the 
location that experienced the largest accessibility gain (see Figure 1 in the main paper), three 
indicator dummy variables for the counties of the three intermediate stops (used in column 5 of 
Table 6 in the main paper), and the same plus six additional indicator variables for the adjacent 
counties. We use for each of these instrumental variable strategies, excluding (1–3) and including (4–
6), the covariates used in Table 6 in the main text. We find that any of the 2SLS models produces 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Δln GDP 1998-2002 
Δln Market potential 
(𝛿1) 
0.185*** 
(0.051) 
0.225** 
(0.069) 
0.126*** 
(0.031) 
0.129*** 
(0.030) 
0.251*** 
(0.063) 
Decay (𝛿2) 0.022* 0.023* 0.020** 0.021*** 0.021** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Ln market potential 
1998 (automobile) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
 
 
Combination of modes 
allowed 
Auto, rail, 
rail & HSR, 
auto & HSR 
Auto, rail, 
rail & HSR 
Rail, rail & 
HSR 
Rail, rail & 
HSR 
50% rail or 
rail & HSR, 
50% auto 
Spillover elasticity (𝛽) 0.028 0.034 0.019 0.019 0.038 
N 115 115 115 115 115 
r2 0.054 0.037 0.059 0.085 0.059 
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results that are similar to the baseline model (Table 5, column 1) when we exclude the covariates. 
Including the covariates we get results that are within the range of the most conservative model 
reported in the main paper (Tab. 6, column 5), which we also add to Table A15 (column 5) for 
comparison. Only in the 2SLS model using the log distance to Montabaur as an IV and controlling for 
all county characteristics do we not find a significant market potential effect due to large standard 
errors. 
Tab. A15.  Market potential effects: alternative 2SLS models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δln GDP all sectors 1998-2002 
Δln Market potential 
(𝛿1) 
0.174*** 
(0.055) 
0.213*** 
(0.023) 
0.188*** 
(0.044) 
0.108 
(0.078) 
0.125** 
(0.054) 
0.118** 
(0.056) 
Instrumental Variables Log 
straight-
line 
distance to 
Montabaur 
Dummies 
for 
intermedia
te stops 
Dummies 
for 
intermedia
te stops 
and 
adjacent 
counties 
Log 
straight-
line 
distance to 
Montabaur 
Dummies 
for 
intermedia
te stops 
Dummies 
for 
intermedia
te stops 
and 
adjacent 
counties 
Industry shares - - - YES YES YES 
Degree share - - - YES YES YES 
Agglomeration effects - - - YES YES YES 
Δln GDP all sectors 
1992-1997 
- - - YES YES YES 
r2 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.217 0.235 0.234 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. Δln Market potential (𝛿1) is 
based on Eq. (4-2) and the decay parameter (𝛿1) from Table 5, column (1). Industry shares are 
shares at total 1998 GVA in the following sectors: Construction, manufacturing, mining, financial 
services, and other services. Degree share is the share for the workforce (at place of work) holding a 
university degree in 1998. Agglomeration effects include the 1998 market potential, population 
density, the 1997 log GDP as well as straight-line distances to Frankfurt and Cologne. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
E – Falsification 
As a further test of whether our estimated agglomeration effects we attribute to the HSR are 
spurious, we conduct a placebo study using the placebo HSR track that was considered in the 
planning stages, but never built. We make use of the same placebo HSR as in the first falsification 
exercise in the program evaluation section discussed in Section 3 of the main text and Section 3 of 
this appendix. The HSR would have had three intermediate stops in each of the involved federal 
states and would have passed through the economically and politically relevant cities of Bonn (the 
former federal capital located in North Rhine-Westphalia), Koblenz (the largest city in northern 
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Rhineland-Palatinate), and Wiesbaden (the state capital of Hesse). Unlike in the program evaluation 
section it is not sufficient here to describe the placebo track by the locations of the tree intermediate 
stops. To replicate the analysis of agglomeration effects we require a full matrix of the bilateral travel 
times that incorporates the alternative HSR routing. 
As the exact routing of this line was never finalized we approximate a plausible route based on the 
information released during the planning stages and the decision rules employed in the design of the 
actual line. The alternative line was intended to largely follow the river Rhine, but it was clear that 
for a section south of Koblenz the terrain was too mountainous to allow for very high speeds 
(Kandler, 2002). We therefore construct the placebo track parallel to the Rhine north of Koblenz and 
parallel to the highways A61, A66, and A3 south of Koblenz. As discussed in the main text, a similar 
approach was followed with the actual HSR, which in large part runs parallel to the A3. The routing of 
the placebo HSR is illustrated in Figure A2. In constructing bilateral travel times we employ exactly 
the same travel cost parameters and decisions rules as in the baseline transport decision model 
discussed in section 4-B in the main text. 
In Figure A9 we compare the resulting distribution of bilateral travel times (solid red line) to the 
distribution of travel times on the road network (pre-HSR, black solid line) and the distribution of 
combined network times including the actual HSR (red dashed line). Not surprisingly, given the fact 
that the placebo HSR connects the same endpoints at the same speed (albeit along a slightly longer 
route), the resulting travel time distribution resembles the one of the actual HSR scenario quite 
closely.  
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Fig. A9. Distributions of bilateral travel times: Placebo HSR 
 
Notes: Black (red) solid line shows the distribution of bilateral travel times on roads (the fastest 
combination of car and rail including placebo HSR). Red dashed lines show the fastest combination of 
car and rail including the actual HSR line. Vertical lines denote the respective means of the 
distributions. 
In Table A16 we replicate a number of agglomeration models using the travel time matrix computed 
for the placebo HSR scenario instead of the actual HSR scenario travel times. Column (1) reports the 
baseline NLS model, which corresponds to Table 5, column (1) in the main text. While we find a 
borderline significant market potential elasticity effect, the decay parameter is estimated very 
imprecisely. Yet, the positive coefficients together indicate some accessibility benefits, which runs 
counter to the idea of the falsification exercise. It is important to note, however, that because of the 
placebo stops Bonn and Koblenz are relatively close to Siegburg and Montabaur, the placebo effect 
may be capturing an effect of the actual line, discounted by the time distance between the actual and 
the placebo stops. The 2SLS estimator using indicator variables for the placebo intermediate stops as 
instrumental variables mitigates this problem as it identifies the market potential effect only from 
the placebo intermediate stops exclusively. As before, we fix the decay parameter at the value 
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estimated in (1) in the remainder of the Table A16 to ensure that the estimates of the market 
potential elasticity are comparable. Once we restrict the identifying variation to the intermediate 
placebo stops in (2), the market potential effect is essentially zero. The market potential effect also 
becomes insignificant once we add controls for correlated trends (3–6). With the largest set of 
controls the effect is close to zero (6), and even negative (and insignificant) if we combine all controls 
with a 2SLS estimation strategy (7). All in all, it seems fair to conclude that the placebo test is passed 
comfortably and that the effects reported in the main text are primarily driven by the intermediate 
stops on the actual line which, as we have argued, provide plausibly exogenous quasi-experimental 
variation.  
Tab. A16.  Agglomeration effects with placebo HSR track 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Δln GDP 1998-2002 
 NLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
Δln Market potential 
(𝛿1) 
0.136* 
(0.074) 
0.004 
(0.067) 
0.119 
(0.076) 
0.114 
(0.076) 
0.066 
(0.081) 
0.042 
(0.083) 
-0.030 
(0.132) 
Decay (𝛿2) 0.012       
 (0.022)       
Industry shares - - YES YES YES YES YES 
Degree share - - - YES YES YES YES 
Agglomeration effects - - - - YES YES YES 
Δln GDP all sectors 
1992-1997 
- - - - - YES YES 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
r2 0.018 0.001 0.103 0.123 0.204 0.221 0.218 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. 𝛿2 is fixed to the estimated 
value in (1) in models (2-7) to maintain comparability of the market potential elasticity (𝛿1) 
Estimate. Industry shares are shares at total 1998 GVA in the following sectors: Construction, 
manufacturing, mining, financial services, and other services. Degree share is the share for the 
workforce (at place of work) holding a university degree in 1998. Agglomeration effects include the 
1998 market potential, population density, the 1997 log GDP as well  as straight-line distances to 
Frankfurt and Cologne. Instrumental variables in column (2) and (7) are three indicator variations, 
each denoting one of the counties in which the placebo intermediate stops in Bonn, Koblenz, and 
Wiesbaden are located. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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